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Abstract 
Korea’s national cybersecurity governance system is characterized by 
high levels of fragmentation and instability, unable to form coherent 
national-level response to increasingly sophisticated and devastating 
cyber attacks, with the public, private and military sector each 
struggling to provide for its own cybersecurity. The purpose of this 
paper is to analyze the contemporary situation and underlying problems 
of South Korea’s national cybersecurity in the area of critical 
information infrastructure from the governance perspective, then 
suggest relevant policy measures to bolster cybersecurity of critical 
information infrastructure. In order to fulfill the objective, this paper 
first examines the theories pertinent to the concept and emergence of the 
governance perspective in the disciplines of social science. Then, the 
components of governance and the requirements for successful 
governance are explored in order to establish the dimensions of analysis.  
Subsequently, the paper undertakes a case-study of the U.S. 
cybersecurity governance system to draw relevant policy implications.  
The following chapter examines the contemporary situation and 
underlying problems of South Korea’s cybersecurity governance, in 
accordance with the five dimensions of the governance system. This 
paper concludes with policy suggestions to consolidate stable and 
sustainable cybersecurity governance system in Korea. 
 
KEYWORDS: cybersecurity, governance, critical information 
infrastructure, cyber attack, South Korea 
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1.1 Research Background 
 
Contemporary Cyber Threat Landscape  
National security can no longer be isolated from cybersecurity, with almost all 
modern services heavily dependent on digitalized modes. In terms of the range and 
scope of potential ramifications, cyber attacks currently outstrip the risk of physical 
attacks.1 Cyber attacks affect both the economic and political stability of a state, as 
the range of cyber crimes have multiplied from cyber espionage, targeting of major 
critical infrastructures and services such as the electric-grid and banking services, to 
destructive military grade weapon, such as Stuxnet, a malicious computer worm 
which destroyed the development of Iranian nuclear facilities in 2010.2 They also 
pose a significant threat to the future trajectory of democracies, as experienced during 
the 2016 U.S. presidential elections. The frequency of cyber attacks has also been on 
the rise, as resorting to cyber weapons, unlike traditional forms of military weapons, 
possess low barrier to entry, low risk of potential retaliation, and advantage of relative 
anonymity of the attacker.3   
                                                
1  Anthony Craig and Brandon Valeriano, "Conceptualising Cyber Arms Races," International 
Conference on Cyber Conflict 8, no. 5 (2016):141-158. 
 
2 James Farrell and Rafal Rohozinski, "Stuxnet and the Future of Cyber War." Survival 53, no. 1 (2011): 
23-40. 
 
3  Valeriano, Brandon, and Ryan Maness, Cyber war versus cyber realities: Cyber conflict in the 
international system (London: Oxford University Press, 2015). 
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Critical Infrastructures (CI) are specific infrastructures which possess significant 
national importance, as they underpin the wellbeing a country’s population and 
economy. Deliberate or inadvertent disturbance to CI can wreak havoc on national 
economy, and potentially provoke national security ramifications. In the recent 
decades, increased utilization of Information and Telecommunication Technologies 
(ICT) to monitor and manage CI has contributed to operational efficiencies; however, 
rising dependency on ICT has heightened vulnerability to cyber attacks. 
In the context of South Korea, heavy reliance on ICT in the wide range of CI 
sectors, renders it particularly prone to potential disturbances to continuous CI 
functioning. Considering the recent atmosphere of abating diplomatic tensions 
between South and North Korea, North Korea is unlikely to launch physical attacks 
on the South by sea, air or land. Nonetheless, regardless of the reconciliatory 
geopolitical climate, North Korea’s attacks in cyberspace continues to expand. 4 
Previously, North Korea’s intention of launching cyber attacks sought to extract 
military information from Korea. Recently, amidst international sanctions on North 
Korea to deter further nuclear development, it has shifted its focus of cyber attacks 
on targeting financial service sectors to seek alternative sources of funding for its 
nuclear development. The estimated financial losses from North Korea’s cyber 
attacks on crypto-currency exchange between 2015-2018 is 100 billion won, yet 
Korea has been unable to undertake effective countermeasures against North Korea’s 
                                                
4 Timothy Martin, “North Korea While Professing Peace Escalated Cyber attacks on South,” Wall Street 




increasing frequency of cyber attacks. 5  There exist significant barriers to active 
response to North Korea’s cyber attacks. Korea possesses asymmetric weakness 
compared to North Korea in the realm of cyber space, as Korea’s dependence on 
cyber infrastructure is much greater than that of North Korea’s, rendering it more 
vulnerable to cyber attacks. Furthermore, Korea currently lacks information 
infrastructure to launch effective retaliatory cyber attacks on North Korea, and should 
such means be acquired, there is a possibility of such retaliatory action escalating into 
a physical war.  
 
International Legal Vacuum in Tackling Cyber Breaches  
Cyber threats are destabilizing forces in international security, yet the speed of 
technological advances continuously outpaces the international legal and policy 
developments. Currently, there is an absence of an overarching international legal 
framework to provide effective legal remedies for cyber breaches occurring at an 
international level. This is largely due to challenges in accurately identifying the 
perpetrator. Under the existing international legal framework, for a state to be held 
responsible for a particular act, the act must be attributable to the state concerned. 
Regarding cyber attacks however, states covertly operate through non-state actors, 
and frequently employ proxies, rendering it challenging to establish legal attribution 
required to hold states responsible for cyber breaches.6 Furthermore, should legal 
                                                
5 Won Byung Chul, “The Reality of Cybersecurity in Korea by Four Cybersecurity Experts,” Boan News, 
November 12 2018, accessed February 10, 2019, https://www.boannews.com/media/view 
 
6 Hathaway, Oona, Rebecca Crootof, Philip Levitz, and Haley Nix, "The law of cyber-attack," California 
Law Review 100 (2012): 817. 
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attribution be successfully established, the international law currently lacks 
mechanisms to allow effective response to a cyber attack, as the state’s use of force 
is limited to self-defense in response to an armed attack, which concerns the gravest 
use of physical force. 7  In the same vein, countermeasures under specific 
circumstances may be a viable option under the international law, yet, the lengthy 
procedural requirements are deemed impractical in expedient response to impending 
cyber attacks.  
 
Need for a Coherent Cybersecurity Governance 
In coping with such reality, well coordinated national cybersecurity governance is 
critical, and the increasing government expenditures allocated specifically towards 
cybersecurity across major Western powers is evidence of their current efforts.8 
Currently, Korea’s cybersecurity governance remains highly fragmented, unable to 
form coherent national-level response to increasingly sophisticated and devastating 
cyber attacks, with the public, private and military entities each struggling to provide 
for its own cybersecurity. It is imperative to note that the provision of national-level 
cybersecurity depends on forming strong partnerships between the public and private 
entities overall, as the private entities possess greater expertise on cybersecurity.  
 
 
                                                
7 Michael Schmitt, Tallinn manual on the international law applicable to cyber warfare, (London: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013): 45. 
 
8 Steve Morgan, "Worldwide cybersecurity spending increasing to $170 billion by 2020," Forbes March 
3 2016, accessed February 12, 2019, https://www. forbes.com/sites/stevemorgan/2016/03/09/ 
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1.2 Research Purpose and Research Questions 
  
Against this backdrop, the purpose of this paper is to analyze the contemporary 
situation and underlying problems of South Korea’s national cybersecurity in the area 
of critical information infrastructure from the governance perspective, then suggest 
relevant policy measures to tackle the possible cyber attacks upon critical information 
infrastructure. In the process of analysis, the case study on the cybersecurity 
governance system of the United States is undertaken as an instrument of 
benchmarking to attain some policy implications from the experiences of advanced 
countries. To this end, the paper first examines the theories relating to the concept 
and emergence of the governance perspective in the disciplines of social science. 
Then, the components of governance and the requirements for successful governance 
are explored in order to establish the dimensions of analysis. The following chapters 
undertake a case study on the cybersecurity governance system of the U.S., which is 
generally regarded as a leading country in responding to serious cyber attacks, and 
conduct empirical investigations into the contemporary situation and underlying 
problems in South Korea’s cybersecurity governance. This paper finalizes the 
chapters by suggesting some policy measures to consolidate a stable and sustainable 
cybersecurity governance system for critical information infrastructures.  
        With regard to the more detailed structure of the paper, the following chapter 
on theoretical underpinnings and research design introduces key concepts referred to 
throughout the paper, expounds upon the adoption of qualitative document analysis 
for research methodology, outlines the dimensions of analysis, and conducts literature 
review. The literature review is divided into two specific themes: the first theme 
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intends to grasp how existing literatures understand the cybersecurity governance in 
regional and global context, whereas the second theme reviews the researches on 
more specific national cybersecurity governance in South Korea. The next chapter 
conducts a case-study into the cybersecurity governance in the U.S., to draw policy 
implications in the context of Korea. The consecutive chapter, delves into the 
contemporary situation and underlying problems in Korea’s cybersecurity 
governance. Subsequently, the paper suggests constructive and specific policy 
recommendations to bolster national cybersecurity governance in Korea in 
accordance with the elements of good governance. The final chapter acknowledges 
some limitations of this paper, and suggests avenues for further research, then, 
concludes by summing up the research findings and implications.  
     
 To accomplish the above-mentioned research plans, this paper strives to answer the 
following research questions:  
- Why is the adoption of the governance perspective appropriate in analysing the 
cybersecurity governance system of critical information infrastructure? 
- What are the specific components of the governance system and which 
requirements should be satisfied to be considered a good and successful 
governance?   
- How does the cybersecurity governance system of the United States, including 
its institutions, policies, and public-private partnerships, operate in practice and 
what policy implications can be drawn from the case study of the United States?  
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- What are the contemporary situation and underlying problems of South Korea’s 
national cybersecurity governance system regarding critical information 
infrastructure, in terms of the components of and requirements for the successful 
governance system? 
- What policy measures should be pursued to consolidate the national 
















Theoretical Underpinning and Research Design 
 
2.1 Theoretical Underpinning  
This section seeks to provide a definitional account of key terms or concepts that will 
be utilized throughout the paper: cybersecurity, national critical infrastructure, critical 
information infrastructure, governance, and good governance.  
 
1) Cybersecurity 
In defining cyber security, the Oxford Dictionaries defines cybersecurity as “the state 
of being protected against the criminal or unauthorized use of electronic data, or the 
measures taken to achieve this.”9 The NIST refers to cybersecurity as “the ability to 
protect or defend the use of cyberspace from cyber attacks”, and the cyber space is 
more specifically defined as “a global domain within the information environment 
consisting of the interdependent network of information systems infrastructures 
including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and 
embedded processors and controllers.” 10  On the other hand, the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU) prescribes the following as cybersecurity, “the 
                                                
9 Stevenson, Angus, and Maurice Waite, eds. Concise Oxford English Dictionary: Book & CD-ROM Set 
(London: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
 
10 Richard Kissel, “Glossary of Key Information Security Terms,” National Institute of Standard and 
Technology, 2013 DoC. USA. http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir2013/NIST.IR.7298R2.pdf 
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collection of tools, policies, security concepts, security safeguards, guidelines, risk 
management approaches, actions, training, best practices, assurance and technologies 
that can be utilized to protect the cyber environment and organization and user’s 
assets.” 11  However, since cybersecurity for the purpose of this paper seeks to 
incorporate the governance aspect, the definition offered by Schutz et, al. as “the 
governance, development, management and use of information security, OT security, 
and IT security tools and techniques for achieving regulatory compliance, defending 
assets and compromising the assets of adversaries” is deemed more relevant.12  
 
2) Critical Infrastructure or Critical National Infrastructure 
Reference to the term “critical infrastructure” initially began during 1990s, and since 
1996, the U.S. has adopted comprehensive infrastructure protection program. 
Nonetheless, it was not until the beginning of the 2000, until the term and the concept 
garnered more widespread attention, when Y2K or millennium Bug posed threat to 
computer systems across the globe, along with 9/11 Terrorist Attack in 2001 in the 
U.S. In 2002, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security was established, and 
signified American government’s dedication to incorporate threats to essential 
infrastructures to comprehensively promote national security.13  
                                                
11 Overview of cybersecurity, ITU-T X.1205 
 
12
  Daniel Schatz, Rabih Bashroush, and Julie Wall, "Towards a More Representative Definition of Cyber 
Security," Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law 12, No. 2, Article 8 (2017). 
 
13 Randvanosky and McDougall, Critical infrastructure: Homeland security and emergency 
preparedness, 4th ed, (Florida: CRC Press, 2016):74-77.  
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Critical Infrastructure or Critical National Infrastructure refers to physical, 
nonphysical and cyber resources or assets and systems which are deemed imperative 
to the maintenance of governmental, social and economic functions of a country. 
According to section 1016(e) of the USA Patriot Act of 2001, Critical Infrastructure 
is defined as “systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United 
States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a 
debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national pubic health or 
safety, or any combination of those maters.” 14  
Of the various types of infrastructures designated as “critical national 
infrastructures”, the 2013 National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) of DHS 
distinguishes between commercial infrastructures and public infrastructures. The 
former includes telecommunication infrastructure and systems, healthcare systems, 
water supply and treatment management, energy production and electricity 
generation, food and agriculture, information technology and financial services, and 
the latter includes security services from the police and military, transportation 
infrastructures including roads and ports, utility infrastructures such as the electric 
power grid and telecommunications lines, and government facilities.15 
 
 
                                                
14 1016(e) of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 (42 U.S.C. 5195c(e)). 
 
15 Department of Homeland Security, National Infrastructure Protection Plan 2013: Partnering for 




3) Critical Information Infrastructure 
Critical Infrastructures ought to be distinguished from Critical Information 
Infrastructures (CII), albeit the two concepts are interrelated. DHS defines CII as “any 
physical or virtual information system that controls, processes, transmits, receives or 
stores electronic information in any form including data, voice or video that is: (1) 
vital to the functioning of critical infrastructure; (2) So vital to the United States that 
the incapacity or destruction of such systems would have a debilitating impact on 
national security, national economic security, or national public health or safety; or 
(3) Owned or operated by or on behalf of a State, local, tribal, or territorial 
government entity.”16 More generally, CII is interconnected information system and 
networks which support key assets and services within critical national infrastructures. 
Therefore, critical Infrastructure is a broader concept which encompasses all CII, 
whereas CII does not refer to all critical infrastructures (see Figure 2-1). Although 
critical infrastructure could fail due to various reasons such as natural catastrophe, 
                                                





CII fails are primarily caused by cyber-related threats, thereby focusing more on 
technology.  
Source: European Union Agency for Network and Information Security 
Figure 2-1 Critical Information Infrastructure and Critical Infrastructure 
   
4) Emergence of Governance Perspective 
Governance is a means to achieve efficiency and democracy simultaneously by 
engaging various actors in the process of public service delivery through a horizontal 
network, breaking away from existing single, government-centered operation in 
solving public problems. Governance has emerged under the need to establish a new 
relationship between the government, market, and civil society to overcome 
ungovernability crisis, and replaces the concept of government, which seeks to 
separate the public and private sectors and approaches problem-solving in a 
CRITICAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE (CII)







CI CI CI CI
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hierarchical manner. Therefore, governance is utilized when interdependent actors 
such as governments, markets and civil society, operate in a horizontal and 
autonomous network, based on partnerships.17  
More specifically, in the process of state-power division, which gave rise to 
de-nationalization, the relationship and partnership among various actors of the state, 
market and civil society were emphasized. In particular, the governance perspective 
was activated as a solution to aggregate emerging civil society’s desire to participate 
in public decision-making. Furthermore, the progression of political democratization 
has rendered it challenging for the government to impose unilateral adjustment of 
interests. Accordingly, the desire for civil society to freely resolve conflicts and reach 
social consensus, necessitated participatory governing system. On top of this, the 
spread of neoliberalist society and globalization rolled back the state’s traditional 
roles, reinforced the role of markets and civil society, and promoted globalization 
networks through the emergence of international civil society. The advances in 
information services, expansion of networks facilitated participation through 
information services, and emerging discussion of government reforms, such as the 
New Public Management theory discarded the hierarchical system, placing emphasis 
on competition, autonomy, and responsibility. In addition, the necessity of expertise 
in the private sector due to increased sophistication of government work, the need to 
adapt to the private sector, and the need to utilize private resources activated 
                                                
17 Klijn Erik-Hans. "New public management and governance: a comparison." Oxford handbook of 
governance (2012): 201-214. 
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governance perspective that incorporates the following elements of openness, 
communication, distribution and cooperation.    
 
5) Conceptualizing Governance 
In conceptualizing governance, Rhodes defines it as a “network of public sector, 
private sector and volunteer organizations in policy making and delivery of 
service.”18 Governance calls for a change in the role of traditional dominant state to 
a minimum state. It is a form of new public management which involves introducing 
market efficiency to the public sector, and setting a normative standard of government 
role. Further, it is a comprehensive activity that includes activities of informal 
organizations, non-governmental organizations as well as governments. Based on 
horizontal linkage between actors, and self-organizing networks, governance seeks to 
forge public-private partnerships to attain common goals. Jessop conceptualizes it 
similarly as “the rise of horizontal and cooperative organization among 
interdependent actors, such as the market, society and civil society, in response to 
market and government failures.”19 Kooiman refers to governance as shifting away 
from one-sided and vertical relationships to horizontal interactions between 
government-civilian relations, highlighting dynamism, complexity, and diversity as 
key characteristics of governance.20 On the other hand, Stoker  perceives governance 
                                                
18 Rod Rhodes, “Understanding governance: policy networks, governance, reflexivity and 
accountability,” Public Policy and Management, Philadelphia, US. Open University, (1996): 252-254. 
 
19 Bob Jessop, “Liberalism, Neo-Liberalism and Urban Governance: A State Theoretical Perspective,” 
Antipode 34, no.3 (2002): 452-472. https://doi.org/10.1111.1467-8330.00250. 
 
20 Jan Kooiman, Governing as Governance, (New York: Sage Publications, 2003):114. 
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as a self-organizing network, featuring interdependence, resource exchange, rules of 
game and autonomy from the state, underscoring the interrelationship between the 
government and non-governmental organizations.21 Lee refers to governance as “a 
voluntary network in which various stakeholders or actors participate and interact to 
solve problems in national society”22, whereas Ahn refers to it as “divided and 
multidisciplinary networks that focus on communication between social sub-systems, 
avoiding direct government intervention.”23 
The governance concept of consultation refers to an autonomous adjustment 
form which exists within the civil society domain, distinct from national and market 
instruments. Governance is conceived as a form of institutions and coordination in 
which various actors cooperate on the basis of autonomous interdependencies in the 
absence of formal authority.	 In broader context, governance is new collaborative 
modus operandi, emerging in response to the blurring boundary between the public 
and private organizations, seeking a new form of cooperation based on partnerships 
among countries, civil society and markets. 
Taken together, governance can be conceived as the voluntary participation 
and interaction of various groups or public and private organizations, incorporating 
governments, markets and civil society in the policy process and service delivery 
process to tackle problems by forming a horizontal and cooperative network, as 
                                                
21 Gerry Stoker, "Governance as Theory: Five Propositions." International Social Science Journal 50, 
No. 155 (1998): 17-28. 
 
22 Myung-seok Lee, “Conceptualizing Governance: Governance as a Social Coordination.” Korean 
Public Administration Review 36, No.4 (2002): 331-333. 
 
23 Byung Young Ahn, “The Changing Role of the State in the 21st Century and Governance,” Idea and 
Ideology the Quaterly 44, No.3 (2000): 13-15. 
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opposed to hierarchical orders and coordination. Inherent in conceptualizing 
governance is horizontal cooperation between different stakeholders, which clarifies 
and coordinates each of their respective roles and responsibilities, and reinforces the 
connectivity integration. Fulfilling such objective requires continuous and stable 
interaction, communication, voluntary participation and cooperation, trust, 
responsibility, understanding, etc. Traditional bureaucratic perspective on the other 
hand assumes government as the exclusive legal enforcer and supplier of hierarchical 
system. 
There are five dimensions of governance: global governance, regional 
governance, national governance, local governance, and community governance (see 
Figure 2-2). This paper will focus primarily on the national governance level to 










                       Figure 2-2 Dimensions of Governance 
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6) Governance Capacity and Good Governance 
Governance capacity refers to the ability of governance to solve problems. More 
specifically, it can be determined as the ability of actors within governance to 
organize and operate autonomous cooperation. Determinants of governance 
capabilities include stakeholder autonomy, conflict resolution, mutual trust through 
information and authority sharing, collaborative leadership through respect for 
different opinions, open communication, equitable benefit and burden, stakeholder 
protection, and incentives. As  desirable elements of governance, the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) identifies the following: participation, governance 
by law, transparency (the free-flow and access to information, provision of 
information), responsiveness, consensus-oriented, accountability, strategic vision, 
resource conservation, equity, empowerment, partnership, efficiency, community 
foundation, etc.24 
Different organizations prescribe slightly varying accounts of what good 
governance consists of. Good governance according to the World Bank incorporates 
the following elements: voice and accountability, political stability and absence of 
violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, control of 
corruption.25 The International Monetary Fund incorporates the establishment of rule 
by law, enhancement of efficiency and responsibility in the public sector and an active 
                                                
24  Qudrat-I Elahi, Khandakar, "UNDP on good governance," International Journal of Social 
Economics 36, no. 12 (2009): 1167-1180. 
 
25 Pena, Jorge, Luis Guasch, and Alvaro Escribano, “Reforming public institutions and strengthening 
governance: a World Bank strategy,” (The World Bank, 2000): 78. 
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response to corruption as components of good governance26, whereas the United 
Nations prescribe good governance as consensus-oriented, participatory, abiding by 
the rule of law, effective and efficient, accountable, transparent, responsive, equitable 
and inclusive.27 
 
7) Conditions for Governance Formation 
There exist several key conditions for the formation of governance. First, there ought 
to be resource dependency among the actors. Participation in governance incurs costs, 
therefore, there must be sufficient benefits for actors to participate at the cost of such 
expense. Simply put, actors participate in governance when there is a possibility of 
obtaining resources in which they do not possess, from the other party. 
Second, network formation and collaborative interaction between actors is 
necessary. Actors form governance based on resource dependency, and interaction 
takes place in an autonomous and network, which involves flexibility, autonomy, 
interdependence, etc. However, this does not imply that the role and the weight of the 
actor is equivalent. Rather the greater the resources, the more central the actor’s status.  
Third, trust, autonomy and reciprocity among actors are required, since 
governance is sustained through voluntary participation and cooperation, not through 
centralized orders and directives. Relationships between actors are horizontal, and 
                                                
26 Nanda Ved, "The good governance concept revisited." The ANNALS of the American academy of 
political and social science 603, No. 1 (2006): 269-283. 
 
27  Thomas, Weiss. "Governance, good governance and global governance: conceptual and actual 
challenges." Third world quarterly 21, no. 5 (2000): 795-814. 
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actors within governance must form reciprocal relationships.  Reciprocity is where all 
actors form win-win relationship by participating in governance, which depends on 
the generation of continuous benefits.  
Fourth, the sharing of goals and beliefs among actors, particularly their 
beliefs in democracy, devotion to the promotion of common understanding, faith in 
and respect for the members.  
Fifth, setting the rules of the game is critical to maintain governance, the rules 
must be complied, and failure to comply would lead to sanctions against the violators. 
Sixth, sharing information and authority must be maintained through 
horizontal power-relations, along with sharing the means to achieve the common goal.   
Last but not least, setting the scope of participants is relevant in building and 
maintaining governance, as it seeks to engage and not exclude any actors.  
 
8) Requirements for Successful Governance  
As there were preconditions for the formation of governance, there also exist 
requirements for successful governance. First, trust, autonomy and community spirit 
ought to be promoted. The role and leadership of the public sector is important in the 
process of accumulating trust through societal-wide formation of social capital, 
creation of reciprocal benefits, agreement and concessions, compliance with 
agreements and rules. Although the nature of governance is voluntary, it operates on 
certain set of rules and trust. Therefore, for successful sustenance of governance, a 
diagnostic leadership is required to create of an atmosphere of dialogue and 
compromise, establish decision-making and communication channels, participate and 
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respect for minority opinions. Community spirit refers to the attachment of actors 
towards the community and their active participation in problem solving. 
Second, continuous participation and interaction should be encouraged, 
whereby the public sector should act as the facilitator to encourage active 
participation. The facilitator ought to monitor the operation of governance, to ensure 
effective communication, as continuous benefit creation critically depends on 
fostering participation and interaction of the relevant actors.   
Third, fostering a conducive social environment by identifying major private 
sectors in the relevant policy areas, disclosing information and encouraging active 
participation is necessary. Efforts should be geared towards integrating the private 
sector into the public management process through continuous identification of 
demands and via community surveys and complaints and satisfaction surveys for 
public services.  
Fourth, roles and responsibilities of the actors should be clearly outlined. The 
public sector plays a complex role as regulators, rule-setters, facilitators or applicators, 
whereas the private sector serves as a decision-maker and service-provider within 
governance. On the other hand, civic groups act as advocates, monitors, and often 
perform the roles of intermediaries. 
Fifth, enhancing the network between actors and services is required. Gilbert 
and Terrell (2013) identifies fragmentation, discontinuity, accountability and 
inaccessibility as problems in the service delivery system.28  Among these factors, the 
issue of fragmentation and discontinuity are largely due to the lack of integration and 
                                                
28 Gilbert and Terrell, Dimensions of Social Welfare Policy, (New York: Pearson, 2013).  
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connectivity. Linkage is an active interaction which emphasizes cooperation between 
the participating actors to attain a common objective.  
Sixth, the establishment of governance leadership is important. Although 
leadership is also voluntary, sharing vision and reaching common understanding 
through communication and exchange of information depends on a participatory and 
supportive leadership.  
Seventh, coordination and communication system should be established. 
Coordination is the orderly arrangement of various activities. There are various 
methods of coordination, such as installing controls and clarifying roles and 
responsibilities for accountability. Effective coordination requires proper 
communication channels, efficient information sharing, and provision of incentives. 
Communication is essential to governance maintenance, and it can be facilitated 
through the formation of horizontal communication channels, establishment of 
cyberspace for collecting and disseminating information, and the dissemination of 
periodic reports.  
Eighth, rule-setting and power-sharing should be established. The relevant 
actors’ actions must be reasonable and predictable, which requires the provision of 
rules and observance to the rules. Furthermore, empowerment is crucial, as the actors 
are to share authority and responsibility in the process of working collaboratively 
towards the common goal.  
Last but not least, information sharing system ought to be established. Since 
governance operates in a networked manner, it depends on the medium which 
connects these networks and efficiently distributes the relevant information. 
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2.2 Literature Review 
1) Literatures on Regional and Global Cybersecurity Governance 
Previous literatures on national cyber security have primarily focused on the 
development and evolution of cyber offense and defense capabilities, along with 
predicting the future of cyber warfare and cyber security dilemma. These literatures 
have also put forth constructive policy recommendations, and cyber security 
strategies to pursue on organizational, national, regional, and supranational level.  
Christou explores regional cybersecurity governance in the European Union, 
and contributes a conceptual framework to better grasp E.U efforts to enhance 
cybersecurity governance. This concept acknowledges the sophisticated and multi-
layered quality of the cybersecurity ecosystem, that deviates away from the existing 
approach of security as control. The author identifies six preconditions, which form 
the foundation of assessing EU’s evolution in cyberspace governance to attain 
effective security in cyberspace: the ability to adapt to new structures and operating 
assumptions, acceptance of complexity in governance logics, formation of trust-based 
partnerships between the main stake-holders, consolidation of common 
understandings of key concepts pertinent to cybersecurity governance, acceptance of 
a culture of cybersecurity among all relevant actors, and establishment of coherency 
and consistency across all levels and actors. When taken together, the aforementioned 
conditions form the foundation of assessing EU’s cybersecurity governance.29 
                                                
29 George Christou, Cybersecurity in the European Union: Resilience and Adaptability in Governance 
Policy, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017): 29.  
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From a global governance perspective on cybersecurity, Bae highlights the 
need for an international norm on cybersecurity. 30  There have been ongoing 
international efforts to establish an international norm, ranging from United Nations 
Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and 
Telecommunications in the Context of International Security (UN GGE), 
International Telecommunications Union (ITU), Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
(SCO), Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), etc., with 
global-level discussions held at the regional, individual national levels in Europe, 
Asia, and other countries, as well as by governments, supranational companies, 
NGOS, and other international organizations. In particular, two major achievements 
in the UN GGE are worth highlighting: delineation of the global cybersecurity agenda, 
and introducing the application of international law to the cyberspace.  Currently, 
discussions on cybersecurity international norms are at odds between the West, which 
seeks to extend the existing international legal framework to incorporate 
cybersecurity realm, and Russia and China on the opposite side of the spectrum, 
which pursues introduction of a new international cybersecurity legislation in 
recognition of national sovereignty. Despite the lack of consensus on establishing 
international cybersecurity law, acknowledging and understanding the different 
values held by different countries itself can be perceived as a significant achievement 
so far, as continuous cooperation can seek to mitigate those differences. 
 
                                                
30 Bae Young Ja, National Cybersecurity, (2016): 97-129. 
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2) Literatures on Cybersecurity Governance in South Korea 
Park and Kim examines the existing cybersecurity propulsion system of Korea and 
identifies the inherent problems in distributed cybersecurity management system 
during normal situations. The authors suggest that the propellant system for 
cybersecurity ought to be integrated, with significant improvement in the legal system 
in order to overcome the inefficient management method. In order to do so, it is 
critical to raise awareness on cybersecurity, with the National Assembly actively 
encouraging interest articulation and pursuing interest aggregation on this matter to 
draw up specific measures for readjustment of the legal system and seek revision or 
introduction of relevant legislation.31  
Similarly, D. Kim delves into the more recent legal-institutional aspect of 
cybersecurity governance in South Korea, and introduces the legal development in 
support of national cyber security. In doing so, Kim identifies fragmented 
cybersecurity laws in Korea as great impediment to effective response to adverse 
cyber incidents. The author recommends establishing cyber threat information 
sharing system for public and private entities, legislating a comprehensive 
cybersecurity law by first tackling the legal risks involved in the process of providing 
cyber threat information to the government, and enhancing personal information 
protection system. To fulfil the objectives of strengthening the comprehensive legal 
                                                
31 Sang Don Park and Injung Kim, “A Study on Tasks for the Legal Improvement for the Governance 





basis for national cybersecurity, the government ought to assume a proactive 
leadership role.32  
Cho and Kwon compares the cybersecurity governance of South Korea and 
the U.S. from the perspective of cyber threat securitization theory. 33  The 
securitization theory is utilized to explicate why cybersecurity governance overall has 
been more coherent and successful in the U.S., then in South Korea, where it is 
characterized by high levels of incoherent fragmented policies. Despite the both 
countries undergoing significant levels of losses from incessant cyber attacks, the 
differing outcome of cybersecurity governance is the result of the country’s capacity 
to form securitization discourse around the issue. Delving deeper, the authors identify 
that the success in U.S capacity to securitize cybersecurity was facilitated by the 
Obama administration’s recognition of cyber threats as key issue of national security 
agenda by utilizing executive orders to bypass congressional opposition. As series of 
cyber terrors took place during this process, passing relevant bills became smoother 
as the perception of the political community as a whole shifted from the protection of 
privacy to inevitably accepting the public-private information sharing system. On the 
other hand, the legacy of conflictual state-society relations in Korea has led to 
fragmented cyber threat securitization, leading to successful politicization of privacy 
                                                
32 Do Seung Kim, “A Study on Law and Organization for Strengthening Cybersecurity,” Study on the 
American Constitution 28, no.2 (2017): 99-130. 
 
33 Cho Hwha Soon and Kwon Oung, “Comparing Korea and U.S. Cybersecurity Governance: from the 
Perspective of Cyber Threat Securitization Theory,” Information Society & Media 18, No. 2 (2017): 97-
120. 
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and human rights over establishing a comprehensive legal basis for public-private 
information sharing system.  
In discussing South Korea’s cybersecurity strategy and diplomacy, Kim also 
identifies similar problems of fragmented nature of Korea’s cybersecurity governance 
as did the previous authors. 34  The author strategizes the next step for Korea to 
strengthen its national cybersecurity, and recommends weaving intricate network 
shield against potential cyber attacks. Building such sophisticated shield against 
cyber attacks require budgetary and institutional support for technical capability 
development. More specifically, the construction of network shield is based on 
increasing the following capacities: prevention, detection and resilience. Reinforcing 
such defense technology capacity critically depends on the availability of relevant 
human resources, in particular, highly trained cybersecurity professionals who can 
comprehensively deal with hardware, software, network, information protection, 
digital forensics, etc., in the event of an adverse cyber incident. In pursuing national 
cybersecurity strategies, the author highlights avoiding the following hyper security 
discourse of excessive securitization, militarization, politicization and realism, as 
falling into these could easily overlook the complex nature of cybersecurity and 




                                                
34 Sangbae Kim, National Cybersecurity Strategy, (Seoul: Critical Perspectives on Society Academy, 
2017). 
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3) Common Limitations of Precedent Studies 
 
Overall, literatures which tie both the cybersecurity realm and international security 
from politics and governance perspective are at nascent stages due to the complexity 
of approaching the cyber discipline with abstruse cyber lexicon from a political-
science discipline. Literatures on South Korea’s national cybersecurity governance 
have sought to prescribe constructive recommendations to strengthen the country’s 
cybersecurity. However, the recommendations proposed by the existing literatures 
tend to be somewhat broad, and tend to limit the scope of recommendation to a single-
focus area. Strengthening the cybersecurity governance requires both holistic and 
deep understanding of South Korea’s unique pre-existing institutions’ relationships, 
and recommendations ought to be sufficiently sophisticated and comprehensive to 
fulfil the aforementioned objective.  
Furthermore, existing literatures suggest “what” the country must pursue to 
reinforce national cybersecurity governance, but fails to incorporate “how” such 
policies or recommendations are to be realistically pursued. More specifically, 
existing literatures indicate the fragmented nature of Korea’s cybersecurity 
governance and broadly calls for streamlined approach to bolster cybersecurity, yet 
fails to more specifically indicate how policymakers can achieve such integrated 
cybersecurity governance. Therefore, sorely required is a research delving deeper into 
the procedural aspect of how integrative cybersecurity governance can be achieved 
in Korea, based on the comprehensive model of good governance. 
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2.3 Research Method: Document Research and Case Study 
This research is a prescriptive research which seeks to bolster cybersecurity governance 
system in South Korea drawing upon U.S. as a case study, by analyzing the reality and 
underlying problems of cybersecurity governance system in South Korea and develop 
policy means to prescribe practical policies. Therefore, although this research is primarily 
dependent on qualitative research methodology, it seeks to enhance accuracy by utilizing 
diverse research methodologies.  
Above all, this article conducts theoretical debates, establishment of the 
dimensions of analysis, analysis of contemporary situation and underlying problems, 
and foreign case-study through document research. In addition, as part of the 
document research, content analysis will be conducted on government released 
publications, internal documents of relevant institutions, etc. Furthermore, case-study 
will be conducted to obtain policy implications through foreign cases. The details of 
each research methodology will be further elaborated below.  
In the document research, document is divided into primary, secondary and 
tertiary document data. The primary documents are directly gathered and prepared by 
the researchers, and the secondary documents are indirectly gathered by the 
researchers. The tertiary documents include abstracts, indices, etc.35 Among these 
three categories, this paper will primarily refer to primary and secondary documents, 
and diverse texts and journals will be utilized to investigate theoretical discussions, 
                                                
35 Flick, Uwe, Ernst Von Kardorff, and Ines Steinke, "What is qualitative research? An introduction to 
the field." A companion to qualitative research (2004): 3-11. 
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conduct literature review, establish dimensions of analysis, and examine a foreign 
case-study. 
For this purpose, this paper makes use of major domestic libraries and data 
searching websites, as well as United States’ Libraries, U.S Government websites, 
and relevant search engines will be actively utilized with regard to examining foreign 
case study. With regard to collecting empirical data and materials, this article collects 
primary and secondary documents to analyze relevant institutions and contemporary 
situations. Collected data and materials will be appropriately processed to meet the 
uses in required parts. In terms of gathering data, various documents including official 
intergovernmental data such as statistics data, white papers and legislative documents 
from the U.S Congress, Department of Homeland Security, Office of Management 
and Budget as well as business reports and publications from related agencies will be 
included.  Publications by local governments and related organizations will also be 
analyzed. This research will also actively utilize credible newspaper articles and 
analyze some pending issues as well. 
In order to supplement and confirm the document research, content analysis 
will be conducted. Content analysis is a research method that deduces conclusion by 
classifying and interpreting unstructured materials according to a type of system, and 
seeks to classify large amount of information into smaller manageable numbers and 
identify trends based on coding rules. Content analysis sets specific symbols, 
propositions, and people that are expressed as messages as analytical units, and 
analyses them according to pre-set classified items and coding rules, such as 
calculating the frequency of their appearance and measuring the space of their 
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appearance. Classified items correspond to research variables, and treat how to 
classify data and materials in accordance with intended criteria. A unit of analysis the 
smallest unit of research contents, which researchers aggregate to investigate 
frequency, is classified by criteria and items. Content analysis can be utilized in both 
qualitative and quantitative studies. Content analysis is conducted in the following 
order: setting research questions, selecting the unit of analysis, choosing preliminary 
item of analysis, adjusting analysis items or targets, planning coding procedures and 
coder training, calculating reliability and analyzing the results of coding.36 
This article includes the case study on an advanced country. A case study provides 
detailed analyses of one or more cases, whereby an in-depth technical and analytical 
research is pursued based on sufficient information of specific individual, group, 
organization, and event. For the purpose of conducting a case-study, diverse sources of 
information are utilized including observations, interviews, audio visual materials, 
documents and reports. Case studies can be either single case or multiple case studies. The 
former conducts intensive study on one example, and is primarily adopted for analyzing 
typical cases, rare and unique cases, and longitudinal comparison. Although there are limits 
to generalization in a single case study, this is not necessarily true for all cases. The latter 
incorporates two or more cases, and strives to overcome the limits of generalization in a 
single-case study, through the logic of repeated experiment.37 Multi-case studies are useful 
for comparative analysis in accordance to the context.  
                                                
36  Krippendorff Klaus, Content Analysis: An Introduction to its Methodology, (London: Sage 
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Case studies are conducted in the following stages: research design, 
preparation of data sets (case study protocol and development), data gathering 
(interview, observation, literature review, etc.), data analysis (detailed description and 
technical analysis, interpretation, argument, understanding context of the case, etc.), 
drawing implication (analysis outcome explanation, mentioning the relationship 
between research purpose and research outcomes, etc.). The advantage of conducting 
case-study is the simultaneous adoption of diverse research methods, often in 
combination with interviews, observations, and literature reviews.38 This research 
seeks to analyze the case of the U.S. national cybersecurity governance to draw 
benchmarking implications, and conducts a single-case study to reveal proactive 
efforts through comprehensive establishment of relevant legislative and 
administrative systems to strengthen its cybersecurity governance system. The 
following section will provide rationale behind the selection of the U.S. as case study 
for national cybersecurity governance, and the specific lists of analysis will be 
established to systematically analyze the case based on the dimensions of analysis 






                                                




2.4 Rationale for U.S. Cybersecurity Governance as Case Study 
 
The United States was specifically chosen amongst other major Western powers as it 
has been a leading country in actively promoting national cybersecurity governance. 
The U.S. has acknowledged the importance of national cybersecurity as it became the 
target of cyber attacks from North Korea, China and Iran in the 2000s. Furthermore, 
the country also recognized its exceptional vulnerability to cyber attacks, with 
increasingly greater proportion of national critical infrastructures dependent on IT. It 
is also important to note that the large percentage of critical infrastructures in the U.S 
are privately owned, thereby rendering public-private partnerships and information-
sharing critical to efficient response and defence against cyber attacks. Since then, 
the U.S. has actively sought to form a multi-stakeholder form of cybersecurity 
governance, which emphasizes the collaboration between the public and the private 
sector, by drawing relevant stakeholders together to participate in dialogue, decision-
making and implementation of decisions.39  
In addition to the consolidation of an effective national cybersecurity 
governance, the U.S. leads in cybersecurity technology, analysis and gathering cyber 
intelligence and cyber warfare. According to the Global Cybersecurity Index (GCI)40 
established by ABI Research and ITU to determine a country’s level of cybersecurity 
                                                
39 Kuehn A, Extending Cybersecurity, Securing Private Internet Infrastructure: the US Einstein 
Program and its Implications for Internet Governance, In: Radu R., Chenou JM., Weber R. (eds) 
The Evolution of Global Internet Governance. (London: Springer Publications, 2018). 
 
40 The Global Cybersecurity Index (GCI) takes into account the following five pillars to measure a 
country’s level of cybersecurity against cyber attacks at a global level: (i) Legal Measures, (ii) Technical 
Measures, (iii) Organizational Measures, (iv) Capacity Building, and (v) Cooperation which are then 
aggregated into an overall score. 
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threat preparedness, the U.S. is ranked as number one in terms of best prepared 
against cyber attacks. Accordingly, this paper selects the cybersecurity governance 
system of the U.S., among other countries as a target of case study to draw 
benchmarking implications from the experiences of advanced countries.  
 
2.5 Dimensions of Analysis 
The governance system is a type of comprehensive entity, which consists of some 
sub-components. In order to establish and operate the governance system, various 
components such as legal institutions, budget, and staff and organizations should be 
well equipped and operated within the government, whereas the cooperation with and 
support from the private sector should be secured from external sources. In particular, 
a firm and healthy partnership between public and private sectors is one of the 
necessary requirements to establish the governance system, since the governance 
system is based on the constructive interdependence between the public and private 
sectors. While the traditional government perspective emphasized the boundary 
distinction between public and private sectors, the governance perspective underlines 
the blurred boundary between them. The public and private sectors intimately 
cooperate in treating public matters; therefore, the private sector substantially 
participate in the process of government policy-making as well as policy 
implementation. By considering these characteristics of the governance system, this 
paper selects the following five components as the variables to examine the 
contemporary situations and underlying problems of the cybersecurity governance 
system of Korea (refer to Table 2-1).   
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The Cybersecurity Governance System of the United States 
 
3.1 An Overview of Cybersecurity Legislation and Policies in the United States 
 
Since the mid 1980s, there have been various enactment of laws pertinent to 
cybercrime such as the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act in 1986. The Clinton 
Administration strived to develop an effective cybersecurity strategy on a federal 
level to strengthen the U.S. critical infrastructure protection against evolving threats 
by suggesting how cybersecurity was fundamental to the confidence of economic 
security. In 1996, the Clinger-Cohen Act, also referred to as the Information 
Technology Management Reform Act, sought to reform the federal government IT 
management by granting agencies to acquire IT resources independently. The Act 
also sought to institute competent IT leadership in each agency by mandating the 
appointment of Chief Information Officers with their roles and responsibilities clearly 
outlined.41 In 1998, Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)-63 Critical Infrastructure 
Protection provided the first comprehensive cybersecurity governance for critical 
national infrastructures. 42  According to the Direction, a Senior Directorate for 
Infrastructure Protection on the National Security Council staff was to be established 
to minimize physical and cyber attack vulnerability to critical infrastructures. In 
                                                
41Clinger-Cohen Act, available: https://business.defense.gov/Portals/57/Documents/Federal 
 
42 Presidential Decision Directive 63 on Critical Infrastructure Protection: Sector Coordinators, Federal 
Register 63, Issue 150 (1998). 
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addition, the Office of National Coordinator for Security, and Infrastructure 
Protection and Counter-Terrorism, in charge of overseeing the Critical Infrastructure 
Coordination Group were established to strengthen critical Infrastructure protection. 
Overall, the PDD-63 emphasized forming partnerships with the private-sector to 
coordinate more effective cybersecurity governance.43 
Following the Clinton Administration, the Bush Administration 
acknowledged the possibility of cyber terror of being a critical national security threat 
after the 9/11 Terror in 2001, and further bolstered critical infrastructure security 
policies through executive order and legislations. Central to the Administration’s 
efforts to strengthen cybersecurity governance is the enactment of Homeland Security 
Act in 2002, and the establishment of Department of Homeland Security (DHS) based 
on the Act. The DHS integrated the fragmented relevant information agencies and 
was tasked with overseeing the U.S. cybersecurity and homeland security. In 
December 2002, the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) was 
enacted, to serve as the basis for other cyber-related laws, and it delineates specific 
roles and responsibilities for federal cybersecurity and mandates agencies to protect 
their respective information systems. Among the major federal cybersecurity 
initiatives, the January 2008 Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI) 
is worth noting, as it forms the foundation for future federal cybersecurity initiatives 
in enhancing federal government’s protection of sensitive information. 44   
                                                
43 James Boys, “The Clinton administration’s development and implementation of cybersecurity strategy 
(1993–2001),” Intelligence and National Security 33, No.5 (2013): 755-770.  
 
44 National Presidential Security Directive 54: January 2008 Comprehensive National Cybersecurity 
Initiative (CNCI). 
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During the Obama Administration since 2009, the issue of addressing 
cybersecurity was further highlighted and witnessed dramatic improvements to the 
US cyber laws. The Cyberspace Policy Review published in May 2009 suggested 
future direction for national cybersecurity, and appointed a separate Cybersecurity 
Policy Official to oversee and control cybersecurity policy and possess direct 
leadership over this matter. The Cybersecurity Policy Official provides streamlined 
policy guidance, and clarifies the roles and responsibility of each institutions in 
federal government to deter, prevent, detect and defend against cyber attacks. 
Subsequently, the administration established cybersecurity center, and appointed 
Cybersecurity Coordinator as the special advisor to the President. Alongside, the 
National Cyber Incident Response Plan was established, and provided cybersecurity 
training called Cyber storm under the Department of Defense and DHS, which 
intended to strengthen central government’s capacity to respond to adverse cyber 
incidents. During this time, the Obama administration sought policies to balance the 
issue of privacy and state security, which greatly contributed to overcoming political 
deadlocks in the Congress in enacting future cybersecurity legislations.  
As cyber attacks on U.S. critical Infrastructure continued in 2013, the Obama 
administration re-visited the existing cybersecurity strategy, and stepped up the 
cybersecurity governance system. The Executive Order (EO) 13636 and PDD-21 are 
evidence of the aforementioned effort. The EO 13636- Improving Critical 
Infrastructure Cybersecurity sought to establish cyber threat information-sharing 
system and laid the groundwork for cybersecurity framework to reduce cyber 
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vulnerabilities to critical infrastructures. 45  The PDD- 21 Critical Infrastructure 
Security and Resilience sought to refine and clarify functional relationships across 
the Federal Government to streamline critical infrastructure security and resilience. 
The Directive also illuminates upon effective information exchange and 
implementation of integrated analysis, planning and decisions pertinent to critical 
infrastructure.46  
In 2014, the Cybersecurity Enhancement Act was enacted to provide n 
voluntary public-private partnership to enhance cybersecurity and reinforce 
cybersecurity R&D, develop and educate workforce, and raise public awareness and 
preparedness. Furthermore, the National Cybersecurity Protection Act of 2014, 
formalized the NCCIC in DHS to share information on cybersecurity matters across 
the federal and non-federal sectors. In order to secure information and data on federal 
cybersecurity, the Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA 2014) 
amended the the pre-existing FISMA 2002 law, revising the roles and responsibilities 
of DHS and OMB pertinent to federal agency information security. Partially due to 
FISMA requirements, the federal government yields plethora of federal cybersecurity 
data, and OMB’s FISMA report is deemed the most all-inclusive source, which 
encompasses federal performance on cybersecurity incidents, cybersecurity initiative 
implementation, and advancements to information security objectives. 
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In February 2015, the publication of EO-13691 Promoting Private Sector 
Cybersecurity Information Sharing, provided institutional basis for cyber threat 
information-sharing with the private sector. More specifically, the Order fostered the 
establishment of Information Sharing and Analysis Organizations (ISAOs) to serve 
as the center for sharing cybersecurity related information among the private and 
federal entities, by extending the existing Information Sharing and Analysis Centers 
(ISACs) activities from information sharing centered around private entities to 
public-private information sharing. On top of this, the Order also established a public-
private entities’ information-sharing channel through an agreement between National 
Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center of the DHS and ISAO. In the 
same year, Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act (CISA) of 2015 featuring similar 
content had been passed in the Senate, consolidating the foundations for a stable cyber 
threat information-sharing system in cybersecurity governance.47 In April 2015, The 
National Cybersecurity Protection Advancement Act, amending the Homeland 
Security Act of 2002, sought to expand the composition of DHS NCCIC to include 
tribal governments, information-sharing, and analysis centers, and private entities 
among its non-federal representatives.48 
Under the auspices of EO-13636, PDD-21, and EO-13691, cyber threat 
information-sharing with the private sector had been repeatedly emphasized, and the 
accumulation of such efforts have resulted in the enactment of Cybersecurity Act of 
                                                
47 CISA grants the sharing of Internet traffic information between the U.S. government and technology 
and manufacturing companies. 
48 National Cybersecurity Protection Advancement Act of 2015, (sec 2). 
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2015. The Cybersecurity Act of 2015, identified as one of the most significant piece 
of cyber-related legislation, provides a stable legal framework for establishing 
information-sharing system among the private sector and federal government entities. 
The Act safe harbors private sectors which share cybersecurity information from 
liability, and grants other entities external to the federal government to monitor 
information systems and pursue defensive cybersecurity measures. Furthermore, the 
Act contains provisions for a cybersecurity propulsion system to regulate and identify 
federal authority and responsibilities pertinent to cybersecurity. It also mandates all 
civilian agencies to adopt EINSTEIN49, in order to detect and deter threats to federal 
networks.50 In the following year, the Cybersecurity National Action Plan (CNAP) 
was introduced to establish practical action plan for Federal Government, and 
facilitate conditions necessary for long-run strategies to fortify national cybersecurity 
across the Federal Government, private-sector and individuals. The Plan established 
the Commission on Enhancing National Cybersecurity, consisting of top strategic, 
business and technical members outside the government, to give practical advice on 
bolstering long-term cybersecurity. 
Following the Obama Administration, the incumbent Trump Administration 
has continued the momentum accumulated from previous administrations to enhance 
the cybersecurity governance system of the country. In May 2017, President Trump 
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issued Executive Order-13800 Strengthening the Cybersecurity of Federal Networks 
and Critical Infrastructure. The Order seeks to modernize Federal information 
technology infrastructure by forming strong partnership across the Federal 
Government with state and local government and private entities to safeguard critical 
Information infrastructures against the backdrop of escalating cybersecurity threats. 
Furthermore, the Administration enacted National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) Small Business Cybersecurity Act in 2018 for the purpose of 
providing cost-effective cybersecurity strategies for small- and medium-sized 
businesses (SMB) which are more susceptible to growing cyber threats. The Act 
mandates the NIST to take into account the nature and size of small businesses when 
formulating voluntary, consensus-based, industry-led guidelines to reduce cyber 
vulnerabilities of critical infrastructure. The Administration also renewed the 
National Cyber Strategy (NCS) in the same year, revealing the most comprehensive 
and proactive NCS to date. The strategy directs periodical review of defense against 
cyber attacks, and continues the ongoing efforts to build collaboration across various 
stake-holders to enhance common defense against cyber attacks.  
More controversially, the Trump Administration rescinded PDD-20 of the 
Obama-era, which limits the use of offensive cyber weapons, and alleviated certain 
restrictions governing the approval process for the use of offensive cyber weapons.51 
This signifies that the Administration intends to respond not only defensively but also 
                                                
51	Dustin Volz, “Trump, Seeking to Relax Rules on U.S. Cyber	attacks, Reverses Obama Directive,” 




offensively should it be deemed necessary, and endorses the best defense is good 
offense logic, by deterring adversaries through effective cyber offense. The change 
delegates greater authority to the commander of U.S. Cyber Command, essentially 
granting the U.S. military to utilize cyber offensives against U.S. adversaries with 
significantly less oversight from the State Department, Commerce Department, and 
intelligence agencies. Although the rescinding of PDD-20 has received mixed views, 
as more frequent cyber offensives towards U.S adversaries could provoke greater 
retaliation, the intention serves to streamline the process of responding to imminent 
cyber attacks in certain circumstances, and reduces the time-consuming process of 
coordinating with various agencies.   
Overall, there have been great continuities over the past Administrations in 
formulating and consolidating stable cybersecurity governance system in the U.S., 
and the country has been successful in forging a common-defense line against cyber 
threats through the combination of Executive Orders, Presidential Decision 
Directives, and provision of solid legal basis for information-sharing between the 
public and private entities. Currently, the U.S. is at the crossroads of reinforcing a 








  3.2 Administrative System: Roles and Responsibilities 
 
The Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 mandates every federal 
agency to be responsible for its own cybersecurity. Nonetheless, some agencies 
including the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST), and the General Services Administration (GSA) 
serve inter-dependent functions in facilitating and monitoring other agencies’ 
cybersecurity measures. Among the aforementioned agencies, the DHS oversees the 
other agencies in implementing federal cybersecurity practices. Overall, these 
agencies each with its prescribed roles and responsibilities interact in a sophisticated 
manner to reinforce federal cybersecurity. The (Figure 3-1) below outlines the 
sequential interaction between the key agencies involved in Federal cybersecurity.  
 
 
Figure 3-1 Sequential Interaction Between Key Agencies 
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To further elaborate on each of the aforementioned agencies’ roles, the OMB 
is charged with formulating and overseeing the entire implementation of policies, 
standards, and guidelines on federal information security.52 The NIST is tasked with 
formulating mandatory standards and guidelines for non-national security federal 
information systems.53 Yet, the NIST does not possess the authority to verse or 
demand compliance. The DHS performs the leading operational role in facilitating 
cybersecurity risk management through the protection of federal networks. In broadly 
outlining its functions, the DHS strives to offer consistent set of security to all 
agencies, serve as an information-sharing center, promotes comprehensive 
implementation of NIST guidance, and lends assistance to other agencies in 
responding to adverse cyber incidents. The GSA identifies and delivers the necessary 
cybersecurity products and services for federal agencies. 
In addition to the OMB, DHS, NIST, and GSA, other agencies such as the 
Department of Defense (DOD), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the 
National Security Agency (NSA) also perform vital roles to enhance federal 
cybersecurity. The intelligence community offers crucial pieces of information in 
aiding civilian aspects of federal government in identifying, deterring and responding 
to cyber incidents. Both the DOD and NSA offers technical and defensive assistance 
in support of other agencies, and the FBI is tasked with directing federal investigation 
                                                
52 Office of Management and Budget Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 Annual 
Report to Congress Fiscal Year 2016. https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/ briefing-
room/presidential-actions/related-omb-material/fy_2016_fisma_report%20to.  
 




should federal systems be compromised. Furthermore, the DOD and intelligence 
agencies are charged with the protection of national security systems, including 
sensitive classified networks.  
 
3.3 Federal Cybersecurity Budget 
 
 Although the federal government allocates increasingly greater proportion of 
the national budget in support of federal IT and cybersecurity, grasping the precise 
spending trends is challenging due to the variance in accounting methods across 
different sources. On top of this difficulty, there is no consensus on what the 
cybersecurity spending is exactly composed of. Notwithstanding these inherent 
challenges, this paper will refer to the Executive Office of the President OMB IT 
Dashboard, an official website of the U.S. Government which displays federal 
information technology online for federal agencies and public scrutiny. Government-
wide IT spending is referred to as “the total budgetary resources based on 
Development, Modernization, and Enhancement (DME) and Operations and 
Maintenance (O&M) services.”54 
 The Cybersecurity spending is generally characterized by an upward trend, 
along with the Federal IT spending (refer to figure 3-2). In the more recent years 
however, from 2018-2020, the proportion of cybersecurity spending has seen even 
greater increase, which strongly correlates with the National Cyber Strategy plan in 
                                                
54 Office of Management and Budget, IT Dashboard https://itdashboard.gov/ accessed 2019.  
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Source: Office of Management and Budget (2019) 
Figure 3-2 Federal IT Spending and Cybersecurity Spending FY 2011-2020  
 
It is important to note that the graph is not an entirely comprehensive calculation of 
government-wide spending based on IT investments, as it omits sensitive classified 
IT spending and the IT Modernization fund.  
 
 
                                                
55  National Cyber Strategy of the United States of America 2018, available, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/National-Cyber-Strategy.pdf. 
 



















3.4 Public-Private Partnership: Critical Infrastructure Sector Partnership 
 
The U.S. has relentlessly emphasized public-private partnership as the 
backbone of cyber-security strategy.56 The privatization of Critical Infrastructures in 
the 1990s, relying on private-sector efficiency and business practices awakened the 
need for a public-private partnership early on. Since a large proportion of national 
critical infrastructure is privately owned and operated, public-private sector 
partnership which facilitate integrated and cooperative engagement are critical to 
critical infrastructure security. Such partnerships are to foster an environment 
conducive to information-sharing on critical threat information, risk mitigation, and 
other crucial pieces of information.   
The DHS Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) plays a 
leading role in coordinating the public and private sectors on critical infrastructure 
sector partnerships. CISA seeks to form national capacity to defend against cyber 
attacks in collaboration with the federal government. In order to protect government 
networks which underpin critical operations of partner departments and agencies, 
CISA provides cybersecurity tools, incident response services and assessment 
capabilities.   
 Housed within the CISA is the National Risk Management Center (NRMC) 
which undertakes planning, analysis, and collaboration center in order to identify and 
address the the greatest risks to the country’s critical infrastructure. In doing so, the 
                                                
56 William J. Clinton, National Plan for Information Systems Protection Version 1.0: an invitation to a 
dialogue (Washington DC: The White House, 2000); George W. Bush, The National Strategy to Secure 
Cyberspace (Washington DC: The White House, 2003). 
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NRMC closely works with the private sector and other important stakeholders in the 
critical infrastructure sector to “identify, analyze, prioritize, and manage” risks and 
vulnerabilities to national critical infrastructures. Damage or disruption to the 
national critical infrastructure functions would have a severely crippling ramification 
on the country’s security, economic security, public health, etc. Refer to Figure 3-3 










Figure 3-3 U.S. Public-Private Partnership Management Structure in the DHS 
 
With regards to Critical Infrastructure sector partnerships structure, the 
National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) 2013: Partnering for Critical 
Infrastructure Security and Resilience lays out a systematic framework for a 
structured partnership between the public and the private sector for Critical 
Infrastructure protection. More specifically, the NIPP outlines mechanisms for 
private sector owners and operators and government agencies’ cooperation. It also 
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categorizes the country’s critical infrastructure into the following 16 sectors (refer to 
Table 4-1), with sector-specific agencies (SSAs) identified in accordance to each 
sectors. Furthermore, it outlines the partnership requirement between the federal 
government and private critical infrastructure owners.  
 
 
Table 3-1 Sixteen Critical Infrastructure Sectors in the United States 
 
Chemical Sector 
Commercial Facilities Sector 
Communications Sector 
Critical Manufacturing Sector  
Dams Sector 
Defense Industrial Base Sector 
Emergency Services Sector 
Energy Sector 
Financial Services Sector 
Food and Agriculture Sector 
Government Facilities Sector 
Healthcare and Public Health Sector 
Information Technology Sector 
Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and Waste Sector 
Transportation Sector 
Water and Wastewater Systems Sector 
 
 
Source: Department of Homeland Security U.S. (2019). 
 
 
 The Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council (CIPAC), which 
supports NIPP implementation, contributes operational framework for undertaking 
sector partnership structure. More specifically, the CIPAC fosters public-private 
cooperation, information-sharing across the entire Critical Infrastructure protection 
by coordinating the private owners of critical infrastructure, trade association 
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members of Sector Coordinating Councils (SCC) and members of Government 
Coordinating Councils’ (GCC) engagement.  The Sector Coordinating Councils are 
self-organized and governed councils which facilitates the interaction of critical 
infrastructure owners and other relevant stakeholders for deliberating on sector-
specific strategies, policies, and activities. The Government Coordinating Councils, 
created as government version of each SCC is composed of diverse governmental 
levels, and facilitate in interagency and cross-jurisdictional collaboration. 
Furthermore, the Critical Infrastructure Cross-Sector Council seeks to assist in 
cross-sector issues for SCCs, whereas the State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial 
Government Coordinating Council (SLTTGCC) seeks to integrate various levels of 
the government in the protection of national Critical Infrastructures.  
The provision of a systematic framework for coordinating public-private 
partnership under the DHS CISA, together with the underpinning legal-institutional 
provision of the aforementioned Cyber Information Sharing Act of 2015, 
synergistically contributes to consolidating an effective trust-based public-private 








3.5 Federal Cybersecurity Monitoring and Evaluation Systems  
This section examines the operation of monitoring and evaluation systems of federal 
cybersecurity in the U.S.  
The Office of Management and Budget is in charge of conducting the overall 
cybersecurity evaluation of federal agencies through the President’s Management 
Council (PMC) 57  and Federal Information Security Management Act reporting. 
Furthermore, some federal agencies such as the Department of Defence or 
Department of Justice have formulated internal cybersecurity dashboards to track 
their progress.58 
The OMB publishes the Federal Cybersecurity Risk Determination Report 
and Action Plan to the President of the United States, which encapsulates the OMB’s 
evaluation of cybersecurity risk management capabilities across the Federal agencies, 
and identifies mission critical cybersecurity gaps which ought to be patched. In 
producing the Risk Report, the OMB in collaboration with the DHS conducted a 
detailed evaluation of Federal cybersecurity by assessing the cyber capabilities of 96 
civilian agencies across 76 metrics to examine the agencies’ ability to identify, detect, 
respond and recover from adverse cyber breaches.  
                                                
57 The PMC advises the President and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) on government 
reform initiatives, provides performance and management leadership throughout the Executive Branch, 
and oversees implementation of government-wide management policies and programs. The PMC 
comprises the Chief Operating Officers of major Federal Government agencies, primarily Deputy 
Secretaries, Deputy Administrators, and agency heads from GSA and OPM. 
 
58 Kate Charlet, “Understanding Federal Cybersecurity,” Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center for 
Science and International Affairs (2018). 
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The OMB’s Federal Cybersecurity Risk Determination refers to Key 
Performance Indicators (KPI) on cybersecurity across the U.S. government agencies, 
published on performance.gov, an official website of the U.S. government. Based on 
the performance summary derived from KPI, the OMB produces quarterly summary 
of progress and draws relevant action plans. The performance summary adheres to 
the following goal structure: enhance Federal IT and Digital Services, Reduce 
Cybersecurity Risks to Federal Mission, and Build a Modern IT Workforce.  
 The KPI is categorized into the following three areas:  Management Asset 
Security (Hardware Asset Management, Software Asset Management, Authorization 
Management, Mobile Device Management), Limit Personal Access (Privileged 
Network Access Management, High Value Access Management, Automated Access 
Management), and Protect Networks and Data (Intrusion Detection and Prevention, 
Exfiltration and Enhanced Defenses, Data Protection). It closely tracks the progress 
of federal agencies’ cybersecurity levels and provides comparisons between the 
agencies along with their respective performance from the previous fiscal year.  
Although there exists room for further improvement in systematizing the 
monitoring and evaluation of federal cybersecurity posture in the U.S., such efforts 
are currently being pursued under the purview of the OMB. Furthermore, the Risk 
Report is intended to drive strategic investment into the cybersecurity areas which 






An Analysis of South Korea’s National Cybersecurity 
Governance System on Critical Information Infrastructures 
	
 4.1 An Overview of South Korea’s National Cybersecurity Challenges 
 
Korea acknowledges the realm of cybersecurity as a critical part of national security 
in light of the major cyber attack experiences such as the January 25th, also referred 
to as “1.25” Internet Chaos in 2003, July 7th DDOS- Distributed Denial of Service 
Attack in 2009, June 25th cyber attacks in 2013, cyber attack on Korea Hydro and 
Nuclear Power (KHNO) plant in 2014, hacking incident of national defense data 
integration center which serves as the backbone of national defense network, etc.59 In 
particular, the KHNO cyber incident sparked national interest, as North Korea stole 
critical information from KHNO through various channels, risking the safety and 
lives of South Korean citizens.   
Despite possessing one of the world’s fastest and most mobile IT 
infrastructures, and being one of the most cyber dependent countries, Korea has 
relatively insecure infrastructures vulnerable to cyber-attacks. Previously, hackers 
have compromised sensitive information and the welfare of government officials and 
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civilians by targeting government agencies, and the increasing frequency and gravity 
of cyber attacks have led the Korean government to reassess and re-strategize national 
cybersecurity.  
North Korea’s cyber attack capabilities have grown leaps and bounds with 
the establishment of the Reconnaissance General Bureau in February 2009, based in 
Pyongyang. The Bureau conducts hacking activities primarily in mainland China, 
crippling systems and forging key secrets of major agencies in South Korea. It is 
estimated that North Korea’s cyber capabilities are only few steps behind those of the 
U.S. and China, and in comparison to that of South Korea’s the gap is alarming. 
Personnel securement in undertaking cyber attacks in North Korea is also behemoth, 
with approximately 1200 personnel charged with hacking plans, 1800 personnel for 
technical support, and 3000 cyber agents from other supporting organizations.60 
During peacetime, North Korea’s cyber attacks could result in stirring up social chaos; 
however, in the event of a war, it has the capacity to paralyze almost all information 
dependent infrastructures in South Korea, which could potentially determine the 
outcome of the physical war. Table 4-1 is a non-exhaustive list of major cyber attacks 
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Table 4-1 List of North Korea’s Major Cyber Attacks Against South Korea 
 
Incident Year Damage Content 
7.7 DDos Attack 2009 Attack on the Blue House, National Intelligence Service, major medias, political parties, banks, portal sites.  





2011 Large scale data damage and service paralysis due to Nonghyunp bank computer network hacking. 
3.20 Cyber 
Terror 2013 
Major broadcasting stations (KBS, MBC, YTN), Financial 
Enterprise (Shinhan bank, Nonghyup, Jeju bank) computer 
network paralysis, simultaneous paralysis of 32000 computers.  
6.25 Cyber 
Terror 2013 
Tampering with Blue House and Office of Government Policy 
coordination homepage, DDos attacks against National 
Computing and Information service, 43 private enterprises 
including newspaper and broadcasting stations’ computer 
network paralysis and homepage modulation. 
KHNO hacking 2014 
Nuclear power plant blueprint, nuclear power plant control 
program, resident radiation dose assessment and program file, 
KHNO employees 10799 personal information leakage, and 
threatened the shutdown of nuclear power plant using leaded 
information as leverage.  
Seoul Metro 
lines 1-4 server 
hacking 
2015 
2 servers in charge of Seoul Metro PCs hacked, unauthorized 
access to 213 company computers. 58 found to be infected with a 










Blue House National Security Office, Office of Foreign Affairs 
and Security, Unification Policy Office, Office of Foreign Affairs 
Policy misrepresented e-mails sent.  
 56 
Concerning the response to North Korea’s increasing cyber attacks on South 
Korea, South Korea has maintained vigilant, yet somewhat unresponsive posture 
towards North Korea. Currently, there are many barriers to forming an active 
response to North Korea’s cyber attacks on South Korea due to sensitive diplomatic 
and military issues involved. Accordingly, pre-emptive or retaliatory cyber attacks 
on North Korea to strengthen cyber defense capability is not a viable option due to 
South Korea’s asymmetric weakness. Not only does South Korea lack information 
infrastructure to launch cyber attack on North Korea, but there exist some potential 
for cyberspace retaliation to escalate into physical war, in which case South Korea 
has more to lose from its developed information infrastructure.61 
The National Cybersecurity Strategy 2019 of Moon Jae-in Government 
identifies six strategic tasks in its first national cybersecurity strategy paper, which is 
published by the National Security Office of Cheong Wa Dae (Office of the President). 
The Strategy includes the following: Increase the safety of national core 
Infrastructure; Enhance cyber attack response capabilities; Establish governance 
based trust and cooperation; Build foundations for cybersecurity industry growth; 
Foster cybersecurity culture; and Lead international cooperation in cybersecurity. 
For the purpose of this paper, which delves into cyber governance efforts in 
critical information infrastructure sectors, the aforementioned first three strategies of 
increasing the safety of national core Infrastructure, enhancing cyber attack response 
capabilities, and establishing governance based trust and cooperation will be 
                                                




primarily referred. In particular, the second strategic task of cyber attack response 
capabilities is deemed the most relevant as this task deals with formulating cyber 
attack deterrence strategies, strengthening readiness against massive cyber attacks, 
devising comprehensive and proactive countermeasures for cyber attacks, and 
enhancing cyber capabilities.  
 
 
4.2 An Analysis of the Cybersecurity Governance System of South Korea  
 
1) Legal and Institutional Systems  
This section seeks to explore the current legal and institutional system in support of 
national cybersecurity governance in South Korea. In doing so, the governance 
system, relevant cyber security legislation together with previous efforts to enact 
integrative cyber security bill will be identified.  
 South Korea adopts distributed management method for cybersecurity 
propulsion system, dispersing roles and responsibilities across the following fields: 
private sector (spearheaded by the Ministry of Science, Information and 
Communications Technology and Future Planning), public sector (spearheaded by 
the National Intelligence Service), and Military (spearheaded by the Ministry of 
National Defense). In January 2015, the Korean government designated Special 
Secretary of Cyber Security in the Blue House, and Secretary of Cybersecurity was 
appointed to oversee cybersecurity policies and initiatives by Korean governmental 
authorities. However, as a result of inefficient response to various cyber attacks, the 
National Intelligence Service (hereinafter referred to as the “NIS”), Korea 
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Communications Commission, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Public 
Administration and Security, Financial Services Commission, together with fifteen 
relevant ministries and institutions since 2011 participated to establish National 
Cybersecurity Master Plan for the purpose of establishing public, private and military 
joint response system with the NIS at the center of coordination.62 
 
a. An Overview of Cybersecurity Laws 
The Framework Act on Information Promotion in 1995 established the foundation of 
cybersecurity laws in Korea, containing broad issues relevant to cybersecurity. In 
order to consolidate cybersecurity at the national level, Act on the Protection of 
Information and Communications Infrastructure (2001), and the Act on the 
Promotion of Digitalization of Administrative Work for E-Government Realization 
(2001), which was later renamed as the Electronic Government Act in 2007, were 
enacted in the new millennium. The January 25th Internet Crisis, also referred to as 
1.25 Internet Crisis in 2003, led to the strengthening of cybersecurity laws in a bid to 
safeguard national information and communication networks. Consequently, in the 
following year 2004, the Network Utilization and Information Protection, Etc. was 
further bolstered along with the issuance of the National Cyber Security Management 
Regulation in 2005 under Presidential Directive, and the enactment of Electronic 
Financial Transactions Act in 2006.  
Currently, there exist no overarching legal framework to effectively regulate 
national cybersecurity in a coherent manner in Korea. The laws pertinent to the cyber 
                                                
62 The Korean Government, National Cybersecurity Masterplan Establishment (Korea Communications 
Commission report, 2011). 
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propulsion system are subject to separate statues in accordance to specific sectors, 
thereby receiving different sector protection. For public sector cybersecurity, 
National Cybersecurity Management Regulation, Framework Act on National 
Informatization, and Electronic Government Act is applied. For the private sector, 
Act on the Promotion of Information and Communications Network Utilization and 
Information Protection, Etc. is applied. For the financial sector, Electronic Financial 
Transactions Act is applied. For critical information and communication 
infrastructure, the Act on the Protection of Information and Communications 
Infrastructure is applied, and provides protection for both the private and the public 
sector pertinent to critical information and communication infrastructure. Likewise, 
different statues are applied in accordance to each specific sector, and is governed by 
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b. Key Cybersecurity Legislations in South Korea 
Figure 4-1 more clearly illustrates the laws which underpin the following sectors: 
public sector, critical infrastructure, private sector, and the financial sector.  




c. Bills for Nationwide Integrative Cybersecurity Responses 
Bills pertinent to establishing an overarching national cybersecurity law have been 
continuously proposed since the 17th National Assembly. In December 2006, a bill 
relevant to cyber threat prevention and response had been proposed, yet, the bill’s 
term was terminated without being examined, in the midst of discussing where the 
National Assembly Steering Committee ought to assign a sub-committee regarding 
cybersecurity. In a similar vein, another bill on National Cyber Crisis Management 
had been proposed during the 18th National Assembly, and placed on the intelligence 
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committee agenda in April 2009, but was also terminated without reaching the law-
enforcement office. The 19th National Assembly marks the most active attempts to 
propose bills on cybersecurity, including Cyber Safety Management proposed in 
March 2013, Prevention of National Cyber Terror proposed in April 2013, 
Information-sharing on Cyber Threat proposed in May 2015. The bill on Cyber Terror 
Prevention and Response proposed in June 2015 had been examined through four 
stages, including the sub-committees drawing up alternatives and inviting experts for 
consultation on this matter, yet failed to reach final resolution. In February 2016, a 
sub-committee for agenda adjustment had been formulated, but also led to the 
denunciation of the bill without examination due to termination of the bill’s term.64 
More recently, during the 20th National Assembly, a bill on Cybersecurity had been 
proposed by member of National Assembly representative initiative in May 2016, 
along with National Cybersecurity bill proposed by the government in January 2017 
for examination in National Assembly Intelligence Committee. Despite the ongoing 
efforts to enact a new legislation on national cyber security, all of the initiatives to 
this date (February, 2019) had been denunciated.  
The most recent bill on National Cybersecurity proposed in May 2016, 
strived to establish more efficient response to national cyber threats. More 
specifically, since the public and private sectors’ response to cyber attacks are 
separate and independent, an efficient response to a wide range of cyber threats on a 
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national level is challenging. In terms of the public sector, since appropriate response 
is based on the Presidential Order on National Cyber Safety Management Regulation, 
the private sector, institutional and judicial agencies other than administrative 
institutions, fall outside the scope of legal application. Concerning the private sector, 
the insufficiency of existing laws to prevent and respond to cyber attacks, 
significantly limits effective real-time detection and rapid response to cyber accidents. 
Therefore, the above-mentioned bill intended to foster legal environment conducive 
to government and private sector cooperation by establishing unified national-level 
response system to imminent cyber threats. In fulfilling the objective, the National 
Intelligence Service (chief intelligence agency of South Korea) was to serve as a 
control tower as it possesses top technology and knowledge in analysing and 
responding to cyber attacks in South Korea.  
Notwithstanding the well-intended efforts, the NIS serving as the control 
tower sparked much controversy, as the bill would significantly expand the 
monitoring authority of NIS on the private sector. Under the proposed bill, mandatory 
information-sharing on cyber threats would extend the NIS authority to surveillance 
private information network, which could potentially lead to NIS abusing Personal 
Information Protection Act by invoking the exception clause under the pretext of 
cyber security, to carry out surveillance inspection on specific users. Furthermore, 
due to the lack of independent structure such as another cyber attack response 
institution within the government, National Assembly, or the court to place checks 
NIS activities, establishing Cyber Threat Information-sharing Centre within the NIS 
was deemed inappropriate. The historically deep-rooted public mistrust of NIS 
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activities is also another factor which renders the bill inappropriate for designating 
NIS to serve as a control tower for national-level cyber threats.  
Taken together, although the NIS is best suited in terms of technological 
expertise and skills to play a chief role in coordinating effective public-private 
response to cyber attacks, excessive concentration of power in NIS, and its potential 
for excessive intervention in private sector has been identified as the greatest barrier 
to the passage of the bill.  
 
 
d. Critical Information Infrastructure Legislations 
The following section seeks to concisely introduce key elements of current 
legislations and regulations in support of separate, specific Critical Information 
Infrastructures: The National Cybersecurity Management Regulation, Act on the 
Protection of Information and Communications Infrastructure, Act on Measures for 
the Protection of Nuclear Facilities, etc. and Prevention of Radiation Disasters, Cyber 
Security Industry Enhancement Act, and Electronic Financial Transaction Act.  
The National Cybersecurity Management Regulation was enacted under 
Presidential Direction in 2005, for the purpose of protecting national communication 
networks of central administrative agencies, local governments and public institutions, 
and to provide national-level response system against cyber attacks. According to the 
regulation, the Korean government authorities are to develop, establish and perform 
policies and initiatives pertinent to cybersecurity, in addition to outlining specific 
roles, duties and liabilities of government authorities. The regulation assigns the 
director of the NIS to control and coordinate policies and management pertinent to 
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national cybersecurity after consulting with the head of central administrative 
agency.65 Furthermore, the regulation established the National Cyber Security Centre 
(hereinafter referred to as the “NCSC”) under the NIS in order to make more 
sophisticated and systematic response to cyber attacks which could pose grave threats 
to national security. The NCSC was ascribed the role of establishing national security 
policies, to assist in the operation of Strategy council and Counter plan council, 
collect, analyze and disseminate cyber threat information, ensure safety of national 
information and communication networks, outline and distribute national cyber 
security manual, investigate cyber accidents, support with restoration, and cooperate 
with foreign agency with regards to cyber threat information.66 In the event of an 
adverse cyber incident, the head of central administrative agency, the head of local 
government and the head of public institutions are to immediately inform the Director 
of National Security Office and the Director of NIS.  Pursuant to this, the Director of 
NIS is to take relevant necessary measures in response to the nature of the cyber 
incident. It is important to note that this regulation applies only to the public sector 
and does not govern the private sector.  
The Act on Protection of Information and Communications Infrastructure has 
been enforced since 2002 to systematically and comprehensively respond to cyber 
attacks on Critical Information Infrastructure. The Act specifies a systematic structure 
in which protections are to take place, provisions on designation of information and 
communications infrastructure, evaluating vulnerabilities, establishing protection 
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plans, responding to cyber incidents and relevant penalties. Information and 
communications infrastructure, according to the Act on the Promotion of Information 
and Communications Network Utilization and Information Protection, refers to 
“infrastructures based on electronic systems to manage and control, and is relevant to 
national security, including defense, finance, communications, transportation, energy 
and information and communications network”.67 The Act designates specific CII as 
be one of the following, i) critical transportation facilities, such as roads, railroads, 
subways, airports and harbors; ii) facilities for water resources and energy, including 
electricity, gas and oil; iii) relay broadcast facilities and the national command control 
communication network; iv) research facilities of government-funded research 
institutes related to nuclear energy, the national defense and science, or advanced 
defense industry. 68 
The Act outlines pro- and post-measures to ensure safe cyber-security 
environment in CII. For pro-protection measures, the Act stipulates creation of 
committee for CII protection under the Prime Minister, in order to provide effective 
nation-wide response system on CII. The committee is tasked with policy 
coordination on CII protection. Furthermore, the Act confers power to the heads of 
Central Administrative Agency (CAA) to designate information infrastructures as 
CIIs, which are operated by Management Agency (MA)s. Then, the MA is 
responsible for conducting regular assessment and evaluation of the CII it is in charge 
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of. Following the evaluation of the CII’s vulnerabilities, the MA is to establish and 
implement necessary protection measures, and the NSCS, Ministry of Science, 
Information and Communications Technology and Future Planning (hereinafter 
referred to as “MSIP”) and Ministry of National Defence possess the rights to review 
whether proper CII protection measures are implemented by MA. Separate reviews 
are conducted in accordance to the relevant sector. In conducting CII protection 
reviews, the NCSC is responsible for reviewing public sector MAs, the MSIP is in 
charge of reviewing private sector MAs, and the MND is tasked with reviewing 
military sector MAs.  
In terms of post-protection measures, there exist three components: 
notification, resilience measures, technical assistance. For notification, the MA is to 
notify relevant administrative authorities and law enforcement authorities in the event 
of an adverse cyber incident. For resilience measures, the MA is to take necessary 
measures to ensure the resilience of the CII after the cyber intrusion. For technical 
assistance, the MAs may request technical assistance to the NSCS, MSIP or other 
specialized institutions as prescribed in the Presidential Decree. However, the NCSC 
cannot provide technical assistance to any information infrastructure which contains 
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2) Administrative System for Critical Information Infrastructure 
  
The National Security Research Institute (hereinafter referred to as “NSRI”) 
established in 2000 serves to research and enhance the national security system, 
national cyber safety technology, national security infrastructure technology, and to 
provide technical assistance for national security, technology policy establishment 
support, train manpower, commercialize technology, and implement necessary 
projects.  
The Korea Internet and Security Agency (hereinafter referred to as “KISA”) was 
established in 2009 as a sub-organization of the Ministry of Science and ICT, by 
merging the following organizations: Korea Information Security Agency (KISA), 
National Internet Development Agency (NIDA) and the Korean IT International 
Cooperation Agency (KIICA). KISA seeks to promote safe internet environment, by 
offering various technical support for Internet cybersecurity, such as the Korea 
Computer Emergency Response Team Coordination Center (KrCERT/CC) for the 
private sector. On top of the internet cybersecurity, it offers personal information 
protection, internet and information security related policy research, electronic 
government service security improvement, cyber-attack prevention and 
countermeasure enhancement, and critical information communications 
infrastructure protection. For the protection of critical information communications 
infrastructure, KISA regularly performs analysis and evaluation of infrastructure 
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 The Information Sharing and Analysis Center (hereinafter referred to as 
“ISAC”) was established under the Information and Communication Infrastructure 
Protection Act, and offers real-time response system in accordance to the relevant 
sector when critical information and communication infrastructure is breached due to 
cyber terrorism or other information breaches. In doing so, companies can form joint-
response for information protection to mitigate the expense and workload, as opposed 
to when it is operated separately in specialized organizations. Currently, the Financial 
Supervisory Service operates the financial ISAC and and telecommunication service 
providers operates the telecommunication ISAC.  
Source: Korea Legislation Research Institute (2016) 
Figure 4-3 Management System of the Critical Information Infrastructure Protection 
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Currently, the Korea government identifies nine critical sectors which comprise its 
national critical infrastructure (see Table 4-2).  
 





Financial Services Sector  
Healthcare and Medical Services Sector 
Nuclear Energy Sector  
Environment Sector 
Government Critical Facilities Sector 
Water Supply Sector 
 
 
For the protection of critical infrastructures of nuclear energy sector, the Act 
on Measures for the Protection of Nuclear Facilities, etc. and Prevention of Radiation 
Disasters seeks to protect nuclear power plants from cyber attacks. Energy 
infrastructure protection from cyber attacks are enforced in accordance to the 
measures, plans and response processes as delineated in the Act. Two major Acts 
exist in support of nuclear power plants: Nuclear Safety Act and Nuclear Protection 
and Prevention Act. Whereas the former seeks to provide protection on issues 
relevant to safety managements in research, development, production, proper use of 
nuclear energy, in order to prevent radiation disaster and to ensure public safety, the 
latter seeks to bolster nuclear facilities’ protection system against new threats such as 
cyber terror, and to establish effective radiation disaster management system based 
on legal and institutional frameworks.  
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The Korea Institute for Non-proliferation and Control (hereinafter referred to 
as “KINAC”) was established under the Nuclear Safety Act for the purpose of taking 
necessary steps to safeguard nuclear energy facilities and nuclear materials, and to 
control import and export of nuclear materials.71 In addition, the KINAC has been 
entrusted by NSSC with conducting threat assessment, reviewing approval of 
physical protection facilities and installation, physical protection regulations and 
protection emergency plan, and inspections on physical protection. Following this, 
the KINAC has also formulated cybersecurity standards for nuclear power facilities.  
In response to the North Korean cyber attacks against KHNP in 2014, 
protection of nuclear facilities systems from cyber attacks arose as key national 
agenda. Under the Nuclear Protection and Prevention Act, the KINAC established 
KINAC/RS-015, to establish efficient prevention, detection, and response system 
against adverse cyber incidents, and should cyber attacks occur, minimize the impacts 
and recover from the cyber attacks. More specifically, the main contents of 
KINAC/RS-015 are as follows. First, nuclear business operators are to form an 
independent and separate Cyber Security Team (CST). Second, nuclear business 
operators are to identify Critical Digital Assets (CDA)s, which refers to all digital 
assets whose systems and components perform Safety, Security, and Emergency 
Preparedness (SSEP) function. CDAs require protection against cyber attacks, and 
are connected either directly or indirectly with the critical system. Third, the operators 
                                                
71 Nuclear Safety Act, Article 6 
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are to establish a Defence-in-Depth (DiD) strategy72, to classify the degrees of cyber 
security to protect code digital assets. Fourth, the operators are to apply fundamental 
cybersecurity measures to CDA, consisting of technical, operational and management 
security measures. Lastly, the operators are to practice sustainable cybersecurity 
programs by continuously assessing and detecting vulnerabilities and reviewing the 
cybersecurity programs.  
The following will examine legislations pertinent to promoting cybersecurity 
in financial transactions industry, securing electronic financial transaction and 
protecting personal Information.  
The Electronic Financial Transaction Act (hereinafter referred to as “EFTA”) 
was enacted in 2006 in order to ensure safety and reliability of electronic financial 
transaction. The Act seeks to clarify legal relations and foster safe and convenient 
electronic financial industry for the people, and ultimately contribute to 
competitiveness of the national economy. The Act specifies electronic financial 
transaction as financial transaction such as banks, credits, securities, insurance, etc., 
through the means of electronic apparatus. It is critical for a financial company or an 
electronic financial business to selectively utilize means of access necessary for 
electronic financial transactions to accurately confirm the identity of a user.73  A 
financial company or an electronic financial business possesses a duty to ensure 
                                                
72 Defense in Depth (DiD) is an approach to cybersecurity in which a series of defensive mechanisms 
are layered in order to protect valuable data and information. If one mechanism fails, another steps up 
immediately to thwart an attack. This multi-layered approach with intentional redundancies increases 
the security of a system as a whole and addresses many different attack vectors. 
 
73 EFTA, Article 6. para.1 
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security to their users, and in doing so, they are required to comply with the standards 
related to the security and certification technologies determined by the Financial 
Services Commission (hereinafter referred to as “FSC”), and analyze and assess the 
vulnerability of electronic financial infrastructure and submit the results to the FSC. 
In doing so, a chief information security officer is to be designated to oversee 
vulnerability assessment of the information technology sector. In the event of an 
adverse cyber incident in the electronic financial infrastructure, the relevant financial 
company and electronic financial business are to swiftly report the details to FSC, 
which will prescribe necessary measures to minimize the effects of the incident.  
The Cyber Security Industry Enhancement Act (hereinafter referred to as 
“CSIEA”) was enacted and enforced in 2015 for the purpose of creating robust 
information communication environment to contribute to the competitiveness of 
national economy, through the prescription of required matters in cybersecurity 
industry promotion. 74  In order to promote the cybersecurity industry, various 
government financial support is granted under the Act. The Minister of MSIP may 
offer long-term low interest loans to cybersecurity company, and the government may 
grant tax deduction in accordance to the Restriction of Special Taxation Act, the 
Restriction of Special Local Taxation Act and other relevant tax Acts. 75  Such 
financial support is expected to bolster the safety of cyber ecosystem through the 
                                                
74 CSIEA, Article 1 
 
75 CSIEA, Article 21. para. 2 
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creation of credible cybersecurity market, whilst also consolidating systematic 
cybersecurity industry promotion. 
The Act on Promotion of Information and Communication Networks 
Utilization and Information Protection, Etc. seeks to foster the use of information and 
communication network, protect information and communication service users’ 
personal information, and create safe cyber ecosystem for the network. The key 
contents of the Act covers prohibition against any unauthorized intrusions to the 
information and communication networks, requires the service providers of 
information and communications to take preventative protection measures against 
adverse cyber incidents, form information security pre-inspection system of 
vulnerabilities, and obliges security incident reporting along with systematic analysis 
of incident cause.76  
Framework Act on Informatization enacted in 1995, later amended and 
renamed as the Framework Act on National Information in 2009, was enacted to form 
the foundation of information and communication industry along with fostering high-
speed. The perspective since 1995 has shifted from fostering informatization of 
society to fostering the utilization of information. The national informatization is to 
provide support for both public and private sectors pertinent to information security. 
In addition, information security systems are to be evaluated and certified by 
specified standards recommended by the Minister of Science, ICT and Future 
Planning.  
                                                
76  Act on Promotion of Information and Communication Networks Utilization and Information 
Protection, Etc. available https://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_service/lawView.do?hseq=38422&lang=ENG. 
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For developing a digital government, the Act on Promotion of Digitalization 
of Administrative Work for E-government Realization was enacted in 2001, and later 
amended and renamed in 2010 as the Electronic Government Act. The previous Act 
sought to enhance public service efficiency and productivity through electronic 
processing of administrative work. The more recent Act broadened administrative 
information-sharing mechanisms, along with the provision of more strengthened 
protection of information resources for the e-government. The key contents of the Act 
emphasize safe and reliable information system as the foundation of e-government. 
Furthermore, the Act confers power to the Director of NIS to implement and oversee 
the security measures.   
Insofar, this section has sought to promote comprehensive understanding of 
legal-institutional situation of cybersecurity in Korea. In doing so, it has identified 
that the greatest impediment to forming streamlined national-level response to cyber 
attacks is due to the absence of an integrative legal framework which seeks to 
coordinate the public, and the private sectors. Despite a myriad of attempts to enact 
such law, the controversy over where to designate the control tower for national 
cybersecurity has further complicated the process, as the control tower must not only 
possess superior technical capability and know-how to deal with complex cyber 
attacks, but also be sufficiently trust-worthy for the private sector to share critical and 





3) Finance and Budget Systems  
 
This section on the finance and budget systems seeks to analyze the trends of national 
cybersecurity spending, and determine whether sufficient resources are allocated in 
support of national cybersecurity.  
The cybersecurity budget for the defense sector is allocated under the 
national defense information service budget item. The national defense budget for 
information service consists of information and communication infrastructure, 
maintenance of information system development, information protection, 
information and communication operation support, telecommunication charge, 
telecommunication facilities, and defense broadband integration network.  
The national defense budget for South Korea has had massive increase from 
the previous years at 46.7 trillion Won for the 2019 fiscal year. Among the national 
defense budget composition, Information security budget is allocated 502.7 billion 
Won, and among the information security budget, information protection budget is 
allocated 55.5 billion Won, reflecting 11.2% and 39% increase respectively, 
compared to the previous 2018 fiscal year. Among the entire national defense budget, 
the proportion of information protection budget which took up 0.09% in 2018 
increased to 0.154%. in the 2019 fiscal year.  
The information protection budget is particularly crucial to protect national 
information systems from evolving cyber threats, and to build the foundation for 
future cyber warfare. As an alternative to the current trend of troop reduction, 
investment in information protection has arose as a sine qua non. In 2015, the national 
defense information service budget stood at 550.1 billion Won, and in 2016, there 
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was a significant budget cut to 460.2 billion Won. Since then, it took three years for 
the national defense information service budget to recover to the 500 billion Won 
range as it used to be in 2015.  
The budget for information protection is further distributed across the 
following areas: network protection, software protection, hardware protection, cyber 
response, protection management, and encryption equipment. In 2018, the following 
three areas took up the largest proportion of the information protection budget: 
management expenses (36.3%), cyber incident response (24.1%), encryption 
equipment (17.8%).  
Table 4-3 Specific Items of Information Protection Budget 2018  
(Unit: billion Won) 
Category of items Budget Ratio (%) 
Network protection 5.29 13.3 
Software protection 0.74 1.9 
Hardware protection 2.67 6.7 
Cyber responses 9.58 24.1 
Management expenses 14.4 36.3 
Encryption equipment 7.06 17.8 
Total 39.7 100.0 
Source: Ministry of Defense, 2019 White Paper (2019). 
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Table 4-4 indicates specific spending trends for National Defense Budget, National 
Defense Informatization Budget, and Information Protection Budget between 2015 
to 2019.  
Table 4-4 Information Protection Budget of Korea (2015-2019) 
Source: Ministry of Defense, 2019 White Paper (2019). 
 
For the purpose of securing professional personnel who will be responsible for 
upgrading the defense cyber capabilities, including reorganization of the organization 
and functions, the cyber command sharply increased personnel budget for military 
personnel from 142.7 billion Won in 2018 to 226 billion Won for 2019.  
Among the cyber security budget, a total of 12.1 billion Won has been set 
aside specifically to bolster cyber capabilities. The following are the specific cyber 
budget allocation for 2019: establishment of a cyber operation control system and 
surveillance reconnaissance operation system (1.4 billion Won), upgrading cyber 
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defense operation system (1.1 billion Won), establishment of security verification 
system to detect and prevent cyber attacks against weapons systems (8 billion Won), 
and establishment of a cyber warfare training center to develop cyber warfare 
professionals. The cyber warfare training center is to create practical training ground 
by formulating a training environment similar to that of the real cyber warfare 
environment, and this specific budget allocation reflects the Korean government and 
Defense Ministry’s intention to strengthen cyber security in preparation for future 
cyber warfare.  
Although the Korean government has gradually increased the national 
cybersecurity budget, and has allocated greater resources towards developing more 
professional cyber security personnel, overall, the proportion of national budget 
allocated specifically towards cybersecurity lags far behind that of developed 
countries. Furthermore, due to the fragmented national cybersecurity governance 
among the public, private and military, the precise budgets for the public and private 
sector has not been indicated in this section.  
 
4) Public-Private Partnership  
 
 The need for strengthening public-private partnerships has been identified in 
the National Cybersecurity Strategy paper, published for the first time in 2019. 
Among the six strategic tasks outlined in the National Cybersecurity Strategy the third 
strategic task concerns “establish governance based on trust and cooperation”, which 
incorporates facilitating public-private-military cooperation system, building and 
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facilitating a nation-wide information sharing system, and strengthening legal basis 
for cybersecurity.  
 Notwithstanding, currently as of April 2019, there exists no defined public-
private partnership for national cybersecurity in Korea, and no formalized new 
public-private partnerships concerning cybersecurity. The Korea Internet Security 
Center (KrCCERT/CC) closely works with the private-sector in operating early 
warning system and coordinating incident response procedures, and offers Cyber 
Emergency Shelter program, which seeks to offer safe server environment for SMEs 
in the event of an adverse cyber incident. Likewise, although the KrCERT/CC 
cooperates with the private sector in terms of incident response duties, there is an 
overall absence of a formal public-private partnership for cybersecurity in Korea. 
Furthermore, the same situation as above holds true for sector-specific cybersecurity 
as well. Currently, there is a lack of public consensus on sector-specific security 
priorities, along with an absence of joint public-private sector plan to address 
cybersecurity.  
 Accordingly, public-private partnerships in cybersecurity in Korea is deemed 
minimal and inadequate in effective protection of Critical Information Infrastructures. 
Such lack of public-private partnership renders critical information-sharing pertinent 






5) Monitoring and Evaluation Systems  
 
Monitoring and evaluation systems play a pivotal role in identifying the most valuable 
and efficient use of limited resources. More specifically, the monitoring and 
evaluation systems trace the progress of specific national cybersecurity goals, 
determine whether national cybersecurity related policies or programs have had any 
measurable impact and have been effectively implemented. It facilitates in the 
understanding and attaining of key information for policy makers, managers and 
implementers to reach informed decisions regarding cybersecurity program 
operations. Moreover, monitoring and evaluation seeks to yield objective and 
systematic data to guide strategic planning, formulate and implement policies or 
programs, and finally re-allocate limited budget in the most efficient manner.  
 The public sector cybersecurity performance evaluation is stipulated in the 
Information Security Industry Promotion Act of 2015: The government shall reflect 
information security performance (i.e. managerial, technical and physical 
information security measures and the performance thereof) through an evaluation 
of the management performance of public sector organizations.77 On the other hand, 
for the private sector, The Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning is generally 
responsible for evaluating policy performance, and monitoring the proper  
implementation of national cyber strategy.  
Nonetheless, comprehensive national-level cybersecurity monitoring and 
evaluation systems have not been formally established in Korea, although their 
                                                
77 Information Security Industry Promotion Act of 2015 
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necessity have been recognized in the 2019 National Cybersecurity Strategy paper. 
According to the strategy paper, the National Security Office is to frequently monitor 
the implementation of the indicated cybersecurity goals and strategy, and evaluate the 
appropriateness of the cybersecurity framework to implement the Strategy. 78 In doing 
so, the Office seeks to review the efficiency of cybersecurity execution strategies 
which reflects the rapidly evolving cyber-threat environment.  
 Pertaining monitoring and evaluation systems more specifically for Critical 
Information Infrastructure, the Strategy Paper seeks to formulate evaluation standards 
for sector-specific vulnerabilities and execute measures to promote undisrupted 
availability of services. Further, to bolster Korea’s cyber-readiness posture, 
information-sharing system, investigation and response by relevant agencies are to be 
evaluated. Specifically, the Ministry has revealed an intention to place greater 
emphasis on information security investment in evaluation programs to reinforce the 
security level of private entities along with the critical information infrastructure.  
 Likewise, the necessity and intentions to provide a national level 
cybersecurity monitoring and evaluation system has been identified; however, a more 





                                                
78 Cheong Wa Dae, National Cybersecurity Strategy 2019, (National Security Office, 2019).  
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CHAPTER V 
Policy Measures to Consolidate the National  
Cybersecurity Governance System in South Korea 
 
This chapter seeks to contribute practical and specific policy recommendations to 
restructure cybersecurity governance in Korea. Although previous literatures have 
put forth constructive policy suggestions to rectify the highly fragmented 
cybersecurity governance in Korea, the suggestions are deemed rather general, 
offering recommendations broadly on “what” the country ought to pursue, or focus 
on one specific sector, when a comprehensive approach is required to consolidate 
national cybersecurity governance. Accordingly, this chapter seeks to extend the 
previous literatures broad recommendations by specifying “how” cybersecurity 
governance ought to be restructured by incorporating the requirements for the 
successful governance system. This chapter is divided into two sections, the first 
section intends to suggest the measures to create robust the cybersecurity governance 
system following the five dimensions of analysis mentioned in Table 2-1, whereas 
the second section seeks to suggest future policy direction to engineer a cyber resilient 







5.1 Policy Suggestions to Consolidate the Cybersecurity Governance System  
 
1) Legal and Institutional Systems 
 
Enactment of integrative law and ordinance comprising the prevention of, responses 
to, and restoration from cyber attacks, the strengthening of cyber security, and the 
cooperation between public and private sectors is required. Currently, the relevant 
laws and systems underpinning national cybersecurity governance are generally 
scarce, and are characterized by high levels of fragmentation across different 
government departments and ministries, rendering it challenging to apply consistent 
laws. Accordingly, an integrative legislation pertinent to national cybersecurity is 
sorely needed. Should such integrated law be enacted, the director ought to be placed 
under the Prime Minister’s Office, rather than at the National Intelligence Service, as 
the integration and coordination of law enforcement is smoother when pursued under 
the jurisdiction of higher government departments than other ordinary government 
departments.  
The content of the relevant integrative cybersecurity Act should include 
provisions for each phase of cybersecurity and response to cyber attacks (prevention 
of cyber attacks, response systems and methods in the event of cyber attacks, rapid 
recovery and strengthening of existing systems, etc.) More specifically, the Act 
should include the status of the control tower, the scope of functions and roles of each 
government ministry, mandatory cooperation among different ministries, solutions to 
create, accumulate, archive and share information, the composition and functions of 
related committees, budget support, privacy measures, monitoring and evaluation 
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systems by the National Assembly or Independent administrative agencies, and 
procedures for objection applications and penalties. Furthermore, the provision of a 
law which enables the government regulation of cybersecurity violation in the private 
sector is also required.  
Second, specific and feasible guidelines for performing tasks pertinent to 
national cybersecurity or response to cyber attacks should be created. This ought to 
be supervised by the Presidential Office or the Prime Minister’s Office, and the 
National Intelligence Service and other relevant government ministries should work 
together to create official manuals or guidelines for the prevention and response to 
cyber attacks and distribute them to pertinent government agencies and private 
cybersecurity agencies. In the event of an actual cyber attack, such guideline or 
manual will facilitate in forming a more orderly and unified action among related 
entities.  
Third, the system for protecting personal or sensitive information and 
prevention of human rights violations should be reinforced. Although prevention is 
the most critical and desirable element, cyber attacks can infringe upon personal 
information and privacy and on human rights under the pretext of prevention. 
Furthermore, there exists room for potential illegal inspection and behind-the-scene 
investigation. Therefore, detailed records should be traceable on the scope of pre-
information collection for individuals, personnel for information collection, purpose 
of information gathering, contents of information collection, and details of 
information utilization. The traceable elements of a detailed record can prevent 
excessive abuse of personal or private information, and will facilitate rights relief in 
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the event of a mistake. Legal recourse through punishments for utilizing personal 
information for personal use or without permission should also be clearly outlined. 
The institutionalized information collection procedures or methods seeks to prevent 
unauthorized Information collection, and human rights violation in advance. 
Fourth, measures should be developed to separately manage military and 
civilian information pertinent to national cybersecurity. Sensitive military 
Information should be prevented from information leakage by prescribing higher-
level of confidentiality, while private information should be co-shared with public 
agencies and the private sector, except personal information, and information 
regarding people or domains which are at higher risk of cyber attack.  
 
2) Administrative System 
 
First, tentatively named “National Cybersecurity Council” could be 
established as the cybersecurity governing body to strengthen the control tower 
functions within the government. The Coordination Committee should be formed 
around vice-ministerial officials from relevant agencies, including the Presidential 
National Security Office, the Prime Minister’s Office, the National Intelligence 
Service, the Ministry of National Defense, the Ministry of Government 
Administration and Home Affairs, the Information and Communication Committee, 
and the National Police Agency. Practical issues on the comprehensive prevention, 
response and recovery of cybersecurity should be discussed, with each ministry 
carrying out clearly allocated task, function, and coordination. This organization can 
be placed under the National Security Office at Cheong Wa Dae, or the National 
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Intelligence Service. 
Second, since cyber attacks take place in a variety of sectors irrespective of 
department jurisdiction, and cybersecurity requires sophisticated technical expertise, 
the system of cooperation and coordination at the working-level manager should be 
reinforced. Thus, although national level coordination and cooperation is crucial, the 
frequent information-sharing among working-level staff in relevant agencies is 
critical to form a joint-response in the event of an adverse cyber incident. In particular, 
due to strong sectionalism in Korea’s administrative organization, frequent 
information exchange among working-level officials, and establishment and 
operation of an adjustment system is required for joint-response to cyber attacks.  
Third, national cybersecurity ought to be bolstered at the local government 
level. Currently, cyber attacks are not limited to the central government level, but also 
occur in areas directly related to the daily lives of citizens at the local government 
level. Such cyber attacks which intends to disturb public sentiment and foment social 
chaos are referred to as the rear infiltration method. In particular, the potential for 
cyber attacks on local government networks is deemed high due to their relatively 
vulnerable cybersecurity status. To illustrate, the local government water supply-
related agencies are deemed highly susceptible as a target due to its lower 
cybersecurity levels and knowledge. Accordingly, the role of cybersecurity agencies 
should be strengthened at the local level, and in responding to adverse cyber incidents, 




Fourth, cybersecurity monitoring system should be established. Prevention is 
an important element of cybersecurity, and information collection on individuals is 
required. However, collecting information on individuals also has a myriad of 
dysfunctions such as infringement of human rights and protection of privacy. 
Furthermore, inadequate management of the collected information could potentially 
lead to information abuse or improper leakage, which could rattle the foundation of 
democracy. Therefore, close monitoring and supervision of agencies and personnel 
in charge of cybersecurity is necessary. To this end, the government should supervise 
the Board of Audit and Inspection (BAI), which currently carries out its supervisory 
functions for government agencies, by incorporating a separate cybersecurity audit 
function. Meanwhile, external to the government, cybersecurity monitoring body 
should be established under the National Assembly’s Intelligence Committee to place 
double layer of surveillance.  
Fifth, proactive detection and prevention against cyber attacks should be 
strengthened. Cybersecurity begin with effective prevention against cyber attacks; 
therefore, raising awareness for everyday users of cyber devises, paying more 
attention to information security, and establishing a system for immediate cyber 
attack report is required.  
Sixth, virtual cyber attack training system should be strengthened. Similar to 
the idea of a civil defence training which provides general training to prepare for 
enemy aggression, simulation training in preparation for cyber attacks can minimize 
confusion and expedite efficient response. For this purpose, cybersecurity related 
institutions within the government as well as quasi-public institutions such as the 
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Korea Electric Power Corporation, Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power Co. and Korea 
Internet and Security Agency should participate in the simulated training. 
Furthermore, major private-sector cybersecurity agencies should also selectively 
participate in the training.  
Seventh, emergency response system against cyber attacks ought to be 
established. Cyber attacks are never pre-announced and launched in advance as is the 
case in a general warfare, but are launched without prior warning. Therefore, in the 
event of a cyber attack, the formation of rapid response systems should be established 
in advance for emergency recovery. This is a similar concept to the 119 system at the 
fire station or the emergency centre at the hospital. 
Eighth, education and training on cybersecurity ought to be strengthened. 
Preventing cyber attacks and bolstering cybersecurity critically depends on the 
availability of competent cybersecurity professionals. Since the majority of private-
sector officials lack the concept of national cybersecurity, education on overall 
information security, including national cybersecurity is required. Accordingly, 
various measures including the establishment of contract departments to foster 
manpower in University and graduate programs, regular education training for 
cybersecurity personnel in public or private institutions, and overseas field-training 






3) Finance and Budget Systems 
 
First, the importance of national cybersecurity should be recognized, and appropriate 
levels of cybersecurity budget should be allocated. Due to the intermittent nature of 
cyber attacks, there is a proclivity to pay attention only during the event of an adverse 
cyber incident, and dismiss the importance of addressing the incident through the 
natural passage of time. Therefore, the institutions, organizations and budgets 
pertinent to national cybersecurity is characterised by instability. Accordingly, the 
National Assembly’s Intelligence Committee and related government agencies ought 
to work together towards securing a more stable cybersecurity budget, by increasing 
the budget by a larger margin than its current allocation. As previously emphasized, 
since prevention is critical in cybersecurity, injecting budget for establishing 
preventative system is deemed fundamental.   
Second, the Integrated Budget and Consolidated Financial Statements should 
be prepared for managing cybersecurity related budgets in a coherent manner. 
Currently, there is a lack of consensus on the concept and scope of national 
cybersecurity, and agencies in charge of national cybersecurity are scattered across 
various government departments and agencies. Simply put, the fragmented 
cybersecurity budget system renders effective control and coherent policy 
formulation challenging. Accordingly, budget planning by the Ministry of Strategy 
and Finance and budget review by the National Assembly should be organized 
separately by the aforementioned cybersecurity control tower organization. This is to 
draw up a consolidated budget report and formulate consolidated financial statements 
for systematically organized revenues and expenditures of the cybersecurity budget. 
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Such efforts would facilitate in clear trend identification in the annual cybersecurity 
budget, identification of which departments demand greater budgetary support, and 
prevention of fragmentation and lax operation of cybersecurity policies or programs. 
Currently, the rigidity and fragmentation of the government budget system is posing 
serious budgetary waste.  
Third, the control function of the cybersecurity budgets should be 
strengthened. The current budget pertinent to cybersecurity is distributed among 
national security agencies such as the National Intelligence Service and the Ministry 
of Defense, rendering it difficult for the National Assembly or civic groups to 
effectively control the budget. Accordingly, appropriate controls as aforementioned 
are required, and to fulfil the objectives, budgets should be prepared specifically for 
each item of expenditure, along with an integrated budget statement to facilitate 
control. Budget controls should not only be controlled through the National Assembly 
Intelligence Committee and the Special Committee on Budget and Accounts, but also 
through the Board of Audit and Inspection and other internal controls.  
Fourth, National Assembly’s budget deliberation ought to be reinforced. 
Currently cybersecurity is led by Cheong Wa Dae’s National Security Office and the 
National Intelligence Service, whereby the budget is primarily utilized by these 
agencies. However, these agencies tend to be somewhat opaquely managed, as budget 
disclosures and detailed budget items are not clearly indicated under the pretext of 
national security. Resultantly, the budget is not utilized as intended and often ends up 
serving political purposes. In order to prevent this, the National Assembly’s 
Intelligence Committee and the Special Committee on Budget and Accounts, a budget 
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control organization, should strictly enforce budget review on cybersecurity.  
Although the cybersecurity budget review may have to remain confidential due to 
national security reasons, the internal budget details should be clarified and reviewed 
in accordance to the principle of budget. 
Fifth, the budget for fostering cybersecurity personnel should be increased. 
Training professional cybersecurity personnel and enhancing their practical ability is 
essential to fortify national cybersecurity. In the fourth industrial revolution, cyber 
attacks will be launched through various new means such as Artificial Intelligence 
(AI), and Internet of Things (IoT), rather than through traditional methods of attack. 
Therefore, forming effective response strategy requires an ability beyond a simple 
operation of a computer, but a high-level of sophisticated and comprehensive 
cybersecurity expertise. This logically demands a more systematic training of 
professional personnel, and continuous re-education of personnel in charge of the 
relevant government and private institutions, which calls for sufficient budgeting. 
 
4) Public-Private Partnership  
 
Unlike the traditional perspective on government, in the governance perspective, the 
boundary between public and private sectors is blurred with significantly increased 
interdependence. According to the governance perspective, the private sector is 
actively involved in the whole process of policy making and implementation, whereas 
under the traditional concept of government, the policy process was managed 
exclusively. Accordingly, maintaining cooperation, communication, and 
coordination between the public and private sectors is essential for the governance 
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system to function properly. However, the current national cybersecurity system is 
managed within the closed policy-making and implementation structure, in the 
absence of proper engagement of the private sector, under the pretext of maintaining 
confidentiality on key sensitive information. The following measures are required for 
the cybersecurity governance system to be stable and robust with regard to public-
private partnership.  
First, an integrative information management system is needed to connect 
public sector cybersecurity information with that of the private sector. Currently, 
although major cyber attacks are launched against government networking and 
defense computer networks for military purposes, private industries such as high-tech 
industries, energy sector, finance sector and water industry, can also be targets of 
cyber attacks. Even regarding national defense, cyber attacks can be launched against 
industrial facilities such as power facilities, water supply facilities, nuclear power 
plants and hospitals in order to instigate social confusion and chaos. Logically 
following, drawing strict boundary between the public and private sectors becomes 
gradually difficult, which demands maintenance of intimate cooperation between the 
two sectors. To better respond to this changing environment, key cybersecurity 
information on the basis of the integrative information management system needs to 
be managed. In this case, establishing the integrative management system under the 
jurisdiction of relevant government departments to maintain information security is 
deemed realistic. Only small numbers of private security staff should be permitted to 
deal with secret information under a specific and limited purpose.  
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Second, introducing the shift work system as a way of strengthening the 
business cooperation between public and private sectors is recommended. Since the 
personnel expertise is essential in cybersecurity, opening up the channels for 
consistent cooperation and information sharing among key staff in the public and 
private sectors is required. The introduction or availability of superior means of cyber 
defense may be of limited value if critical pieces of information cannot be shared 
between public and private sectors, and when staff in charge are not ready to 
cooperate with each other. Therefore, holding periodic meetings between the 
cybersecurity personnel in public and private sectors, introducing the shift work 
system between the two sectors, and conducting public-private mock training in 
preparation for cyber attacks should be pursued. If necessary, formulating a task force 
team to treat common affairs together could be incorporated. 
Third, special attention is demanded for the industrial areas and major 
companies exposed to cyber attacks. Currently, industrial areas such as nuclear power, 
electricity, telecommunications, finance and healthcare, are prone to be a target of 
cyber attacks. If cyber attacks are launched on these industries, whether in peacetime 
or during war, great confusion and chaos will be fomented nationally. Thus, 
designating the industries with high potential for cyber attacks as the object of 
cybersecurity, and to obliging them by law to establish their own cybersecurity 
management systems, maintaining professional cybersecurity manpower, sharing 
relevant information with the government, and reporting immediately in the event of 
cyber attacks are required. These kind of obligation can also be applied to major 
companies that also hold potential to be targets of cyber attacks. 
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Fourth, private industrial security should be strengthened as part of the national 
cybersecurity. Currently, industrial espionage activities to steal key information are 
frequent in high-tech industries. Unlike the past, such espionage activities are carried 
out today through hacking the computer network system. Accordingly, the National 
Intelligence Service (NIS) and relevant agencies strives to adopt various efforts to 
protect the critical information of domestic industries from foreign competitors. 
Despite such efforts, industrial information leakage continues to be frequent due to 
the lack of the integrative management system between the public and private sectors. 
Therefore, managing critical industrial information in the private sector as part of 
national cybersecurity is necessary, as opposed to leaving such management solely to 
the private sector. To this end, a formal platform for a public-private information-
sharing needs to be established on a regular basis. 
 
5) Monitoring and Evaluation Systems 
 
First, a standing monitoring and inspection system to routinely inspect current status 
and problem of critical information infrastructure cybersecurity should be established, 
and a clause to support this system should be incorporated in the integrated 
cybersecurity law. There is a tendency for relevant government agencies to be 
uncoordinated during the breakout of a cyber attack, but dismisses the incident as 
time progresses from the outbreak of the incident. However, cybersecurity requires 
the following series of process including prevention, response, recovery, and 
feedback to function routinely and organically. Therefore, throughout this entire 
process, continuous monitoring of the cybersecurity system function is required.  
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For such monitoring function, the National Security Office of the President 
Office should undertake general supervision; however, to enhance the effectiveness 
of monitoring, routine monitoring should be undertaken by the Office of the Prime 
Minister, or the President’s Board of Audit and Inspection, as these departments 
possess greater power than normal government departments. Furthermore, other 
relevant ministries, including the National Intelligence Service and the Ministry of 
Defence should conduct regular monitoring of their respective inspection agencies on 
prevention, preparedness, and recovery plans for cybersecurity. Accordingly, a 
compact monitoring network must be established for national cybersecurity 
monitoring, starting from relevant government agencies’ self-inspection, then to 
monitoring by the Prime Minister’s Office or the Board of Audit and Inspection, then 
to Cheong Wa Dae National Security Office general supervision. There must be no 
single loophole or any minuscule neglect for strengthening critical information 
infrastructure cybersecurity.   
 Second, coherent guidelines should be prepared on the process and scope of 
monitoring. Monitoring should not be fistic, but should be carried out in accordance 
to clearly established procedures and methods. The monitoring methods for 
cybersecurity systems should be periodically inspected by the government 
departments in charge of cybersecurity, by requiring them to report the status of their 
work and national cybersecurity trends on a monthly and quarterly basis. However, 
since there exists a limit to monitoring through only document reporting alone, the 
team should visit the site biannually, divided into first half of the year and second half 
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of the year, to conduct an on-site monitoring of current cybersecurity status and 
problems.  
Pertinent to scope of monitoring, the government should inspect the 
comprehensive aspects of cybersecurity, including prevention, response, and 
recovery, but should particularly strengthen inspections of preventive systems. In the 
case of an on-site inspections, rather than merely relying on monitoring reports from 
the related ministries, the government should more proactively inspect the 
organization’s preparedness against cyber attacks by conducting simulated drills 
reflecting a real cyber attack situation. Furthermore, the government should also 
inspect the details of cybersecurity budget spending in order to prevent lax spending, 
or out of purpose spending. Even in such case however, the budget controls should 
not be undertaken from an excessively legal perspective, but from a goal-oriented 
effectiveness perspective. Simply put, the relevant budget should be inspected on the 
basis of how effectively the resources are being utilised to fulfil the objectives of 
cybersecurity. In addition, the expertise of cybersecurity personnel, the sufficiency of 
manpower scale, and the status of personnel management ought to be examined, as 
cybersecurity heavily depends on the quality of personnel in charge. Other than these, 
monitoring should inspect the detailed contents of the programs under operation in 
relevant cybersecurity ministries, seeking out any unnecessary or overlapping 
elements, in order to enhance the relevance of the program.  
Third, national cybersecurity performance evaluation system ought to be 
established. The aforementioned monitoring is a type of process evaluation, whereas 
the performance evaluation is a type of summative evaluation. Performance 
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evaluation should be conducted annually or every three years in order to identify 
problems in national cybersecurity system, and to provide fundamental solutions for 
improvements based on the problem identification. In the case of Korea, performance 
evaluation functions are deemed weak in almost policy areas, and policies or 
programs are often unsystematically managed, resulting in budget waste. Such holds 
true for cybersecurity as well.  
More specifically, securing the independence of performance evaluation 
institutions is crucial to establish an effective performance evaluation system. 
Therefore, the executive body should not be in charge of the evaluation function, as 
it would be difficult to establish objectivity and reliability of the performance 
evaluations. Rather, placing the performance evaluation functions under the National 
Assembly’s Intelligence Committee may be considered. However, due to the 
characteristics of politicians, there is a possibility of information leakage, which must 
be kept confidential to the media and other foreign countries.  
Accordingly, should the performance evaluation function be entrusted in the 
National Assembly, the government must obligate relevant personnel against 
disclosing confidential information, and impose strict penalties in the case of 
violation. Further, since performance evaluation requires a high degree of expertise 
in IT devices, military information, hacking, etc., securing expert personnel to be in 
charge of evaluation is crucial. In this case, using a Task Force in the form of 
permanent agency, which only assigns professional personnel when necessary, is 
recommendable.  
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 In conducting performance evaluation, undertaking the evaluation every two 
to three years in general is deemed more practical. Not only will the cost of evaluation 
increase if conducted annually, but the relevant government ministries will also spend 
more for personnel to prepare for the performance evaluations. For the method of 
performance evaluation, both document and on-site assessment should be undertaken, 
as determining accurate performance level is difficult when only referring to the 
reported document. With regards to the evaluation criteria, evaluation items and 
evaluation criterion must be established to assess the current state of cybersecurity in 
advance. The assessment scope can be organized by cybersecurity processes such as 
prevention, response and recover, and can be categorized into personnel expertise, 
budget appropriateness, management systems, facilities and equipment levels. 
Subsequently, specific assessment criteria should be formulated for each of these 
areas, and marks should be distributed accordingly. In setting the assessment criteria, 
heavy reliance on only quantitative criteria should be avoided by also incorporating 
an appropriate balance of qualitative criteria. Assessment marks should be evenly 
distributed across each assessment area, and greater weight should be placed on 
factors which directly affect the achievement of cybersecurity objectives as opposed 
to superficial factors.    
 Fourth, the results of performance evaluation ought to be compared between 
the relevant government departments and agencies, and an incentive system based on 
performance evaluation results should be established. The purpose of the 
performance evaluation is to analyze the current situation to identify problems, 
provide suggestions for improvement, and clarify the reward and punishment system 
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based on the performance evaluation results by linking it to the motivation of the 
personnel in charge of the relevant organization. Thus, each department in charge of 
cybersecurity should produce data which can be compared to the results of 
performance evaluations, then should undertake comparison of performance 
evaluation results annually. Comparison of the level of cybersecurity situation 
according to the year and government departments will be possible when the items, 
criteria and marks for performance evaluation are stably maintained. Nonetheless, it 
should be noted that referring solely to quantifiable indications of performance 
evaluation could lead to inaccurate judgments, as there exist limitations to uniform 
comparison of performance evaluation, considering that different government 
departments’ situations and their area of importance varies.  
When informing each government department of the evaluation results, the 
monitoring body, in addition to the results, should also advise them to formulate their 
own measures for improvement by clearly indicating how improvements can be made. 
Additionally, including how much improvements have been made based on previous 
assessment results should be required as part of the feedback.  
Subsequently, the results of the performance evaluation should be used for 
penalizing the relevant ministries and officials. Incentives should be granted for good 
evaluation performance results, whereas penalties should be given for the opposite 
case. In general, measures are required to incentivize the top 30%, and to penalize the 
bottom 30%. For incentives, solutions for a small increase in the relevant budget at 
the ministry level, a reward for the officials in charge, and additional points for the 
personnel management are required. For penalties, the relevant department should 
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indicate solutions for improvement in the following year, and should performance 
evaluation be continuously low, certain measures such as warning the relevant 
departments must be undertaken.  
 
5.2 Engineering Cyber Resilient Governance  
 
In addition to establishing coherent and integrative national cybersecurity 
management system, legal basis, and budget system, efforts towards a cyber resilient 
governance should be emphasized. Just as complete security is unattainable in 
physical security, such holds true in the sphere of cybersecurity. From a cybersecurity 
perspective, the single greatest threat is by far unpatched existing vulnerabilities. 
Cyber vulnerabilities exist on every level, and protection against every cyber risk is 
not only impossible but also impractical. Traditional defenses against cyber threats, 
such as building firewalls are deemed insufficient in this digital era due to the ever-
evolving nature of cyber attacks, rise of sophisticated and diverse threat actors, 
motivations and tactics. Hence, engineering cyber resilience in the cybersecurity 
governance is deemed of utmost importance.  
The term cyber resilience is understood and defined in various ways. The U.S. 
governmental agency, National Research Council (NRC) defines it as “the ability to 
prepare and plan for, absorb, recover from, and more successfully adapt to adverse 
events”, whereas the Presidential Decision Directive 21: Critical Infrastructure 
Security and Resilience (PDD-21) describes it as the “ability to prepare for and adapt 
 102 
to changing conditions and withstand and recover rapidly from disruptions”. 79 
Although there exists a conceptual elusiveness over the exact definition of cyber 
resilience, generally, it refers to the overall ability of systems and organizations to 
withstand cyber events and, where harm is caused, rapidly recover from them, and 
the overall key words attached to the definition of cyber resilience include prepare, 
absorb, recover and adapt to adverse cyber event.  
In comparing cyber resilience and cybersecurity, cyber resilience is to 
complement existing cybersecurity, as the former acknowledges that regardless of 
how strong the security may be, modern systems will always possess vulnerabilities 
which attackers will be able to exploit. Therefore, cyber resilience assumes that the 
adversary will breach the system. This assumption of the cyber resilience perspective 
allows for a more proactive and holistic approach to deal with adverse cyber events 
than cybersecurity perspective which takes a rather passive and defensive posture, 
and the key difference between cyber resiliency and cyber security is that the former 
continues to deliver its function despite the unexpected cyber breach. Accordingly, 
cyber resilience takes a step further to complement cybersecurity, by incorporating a 
proactive and holistic approach towards better detection through enhanced situational 
awareness, better reaction, and better recovery. 
 
 
                                                





Table 5-1 Comparison of Cybersecurity and Cyber Resilience 
 Cybersecurity Cyber Resilience 
Objective Protect Information Technology 
systems 
Ensure business delivery 
Intention Fail-safe Safe-to-fail 
Approach External security Internal security 
Scope Single organization Network of organizations 
  
Attaining cyber resilience is particularly imperative for mission-essential 
systems which serve as the fundamental groundwork for the national security, 
essential government services and the critical information infrastructures upon which 
the nation’s economy depend on. As such services and key assets associated with 
economic and national security consequences demand uninterrupted availability, 
ensuring high level of resiliency is an important means to achieving the 
aforementioned goal. 
In order to engineer the element of cyber resiliency in national cybersecurity 
governance, resilience as a shared responsibility among all stakeholders must be 
acknowledged. For this purpose, the government along with the private sector ought 
to first reach a consensus on the definition of cyber resilience, and such common 
definition is to encompass both the public and private sectors. Then, the government 
in collaboration with the private sector ought to develop a standardized cyber 
resilience framework, or a common metrics to measure the level of cyber-resiliency 
of a critical information infrastructure, and identify which infrastructure is the most 
vulnerable to adverse cyber incidents. In more detail, the government could initially 
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establish government-operated no-cost, voluntary cyber resilience programs such as 
the Cyber Resilience Review (CRR)80 in the U.S., although further details of the 
program will not be discussed in detail as it is deemed beyond the purview of this 
paper.  
For both restructuring cybersecurity governance and establishing cyber 
resilience, the importance of information-sharing between the public and the private 
sector cannot be overemphasized. Accordingly, the government in addition to the 
aforementioned provision of legal basis, ought to establish incentive mechanisms for 
information-sharing to bolster cyber resilient governance. Such incentive scheme is 
particularly important to resolve the discrepancy between private sector’s economic 
objectives and public sector’s national security interests, in which case the 
government provision of financial incentives for mission-essential private sector 
could encourage the adoption of cyber resilient measures. 
 
 
                                                
80 The Cyber Resilience Review (CRR) is a no-cost, voluntary, non-technical assessment to evaluate an 
organization’s operational resilience and cybersecurity practices. The CRR may be conducted as a self-
assessment or as an on-site assessment facilitated by DHS cybersecurity professionals. The CRR 
assesses enterprise programs and practices across a range of ten domains including risk management, 
incident management, service continuity, and others. The assessment is designed to measure existing 
organizational resilience as well as provide a gap analysis for improvement based on recognized best 
practices. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) partnered with the Computer Emergency 
Response Team (CERT) Division of Carnegie Mellon University’s Software Engineering Institute to 
create the CRR. The CRR is a derivative of the CERT Resilience Management Model (RMM) 








6.1 Conclusion and Implications 
This paper has sought to suggest practical, comprehensive, and detailed 
policy alternatives to bolster national cybersecurity in Korea based on the analytical 
dimensions consisting of the following components: legal and institutional systems, 
administrative system, finance and budget systems, public-private partnerships, and 
monitoring and evaluation systems. In doing so, the paper has identified high-levels 
of fragmentation and instability in Korea’s national cybersecurity governance system. 
Currently, there is an absence of an overarching integrative cybersecurity legal 
system in support of both the public and private sector, and separate cybersecurity 
laws exist in support of the different sectors. Not only is such legal-institutional basis 
inadequate in responding to increasingly complex cyber attacks, but this has 
inevitably led to fragmented national cybersecurity administrative system, scattered 
cybersecurity budget systems, weak public-private partnerships, and unsystematic 
monitoring and evaluation systems. Although there have been multiple attempts to 
enact an integrative cybersecurity law, the controversy over where to designate the 
control tower, and high-levels of mistrust pertinent to private-sector information-
sharing has impeded the passage of such law. 
 On the other hand, the U.S. has attained greater success in establishing a 
more stable and coherent federal cybersecurity governance system. In establishing an 
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integrative federal cybersecurity law, which mandates information-sharing between 
the public and the private sector, the executive branch has utilized various Executive 
Orders and Presidential Decision Directives to consolidate the legislative basis. Such 
legal provision has facilitated public-private partnerships in cybersecurity, and 
effective information-sharing between the public and private entities. Furthermore, in 
terms of the administrative systems, although every Federal agency is responsible for 
its own cybersecurity, the Department of Homeland Security plays a leading role in 
producing operational direction, offering technical assistance and overseeing the 
other agencies implementation of federal cybersecurity practices. The federal 
cybersecurity budget falls under the Federal IT spending, and is managed by the 
Office of Management and Budget. Federal cybersecurity spending has gradually 
increased over the years in proportion to the Federal IT Spending. The monitoring 
and evaluation for federal cybersecurity is undertaken in the OMB in collaboration 
with the DHS, which assists in more detailed evaluation of federal cybersecurity 
status.  
 In order to bolster national cybersecurity, and consolidate a more coherent 
and stable cybersecurity governance system in Korea, as is the case with the U.S., 
this paper has suggested the following policy alternatives. In terms of the legal-
institutional system, first, integrative legislation pertinent to national cybersecurity 
ought to be established, with the the director placed under the Prime Minister’s Office, 
instead of the National Intelligence Service. Second, guidelines for performing tasks 
pertinent to national cybersecurity or response to cyber attacks should be created. 
Third, the system for protecting personal information and prevention human rights 
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violations should be reinforced. Fourth, measures should be developed to separately 
manage military and civilian information pertinent to national cybersecurity. 
For the administrative system, tentatively named “National Cybersecurity 
Council” should be established as the cybersecurity governing body, to strengthen the 
control tower functions within the government. Second, since cyber attacks take place 
in a variety of sectors irrespective of department jurisdiction, and cybersecurity 
requires sophisticated technical expertise, the system of cooperation and coordination 
at the working-level manager should be reinforced. Third, national cybersecurity 
ought to be bolstered at the local government level. Fourth, cybersecurity monitoring 
system should be established. Fifth, proactive detection and prevention against cyber 
attacks should be bolstered. Sixth, cyber attack simulation training system should be 
strengthened. Seventh, emergency response system against cyber attacks ought to be 
established, and continuous education and training on cybersecurity ought to be 
pursued on a national level.  
Pertinent to the finance and budget systems, the importance of national 
cybersecurity should be recognized, and appropriate levels of cybersecurity budget 
should be allocated. Second, the Integrated Budget and Consolidated Financial 
Statements should be prepared for managing cybersecurity related budgets in a 
coherent manner. Third, the control function of the cybersecurity budgets should be 
strengthened. Fourth, National Assembly’s budget deliberation ought to be reinforced, 
and the budget for fostering cybersecurity personnel should be increased. 
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With regards to the public-private partnerships, the need for an integrative 
information management system has been highlighted to link the public and private 
sector cybersecurity information. Second, introducing work shift system as a means 
to reinforce business cooperation between public and private sectors has been 
recommended. Third, special attention is demanded for industrial areas and major 
companies exposed to cyber attacks. Forth, private industrial security ought to be 
strengthened by incorporating it into national cybersecurity.  
For policy suggestions on monitoring and evaluation systems, a standing 
monitoring and inspection system which routinely inspects current status and problem 
of critical information infrastructure cybersecurity should be established, and a clause 
to support this system should be incorporated in the integrated cybersecurity law. For 
such monitoring function, the National Security Office of the President Office should 
undertake general supervision. Second, coherent guidelines should be prepared on the 
process and scope of monitoring. Third, national cybersecurity performance 
evaluation system ought to be established. Fourth, the results of performance 
evaluation ought to be compared by relevant government departments, and an 
incentive system based on performance evaluation results should be established. 
Finally, on top of these policy alternatives, efforts toward bolstering cyber 
resilience based on rapid detection, reaction, and recovery has been suggested, since 
protection against all cyber attacks is not only impractical but also impossible. In 
order to do so, reaching consensus on the definition of cyber resilience between the 
relevant sectors, and establishing standardized cyber resilience framework has been 
suggested as the first step towards this objective.  
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6.2 Future Avenues of Research 
 This paper has provided policy alternatives on domestic cybersecurity 
governance systems. However, since cyber attacks are not bound by physical borders, 
future studies could also delve into how national cybersecurity governance can be 
coordinated with regional and international cooperation. Furthermore, considering 
the existing military alliance between South Korea and the U.S., ways to strengthen 
cybersecurity partnerships can also be explored.  
 Further, although the policy alternatives in this paper sought to provide 
comprehensive yet detailed steps and suggestions on how national cybersecurity 
governance system ought to be managed, in terms of the analytical dimensions 
provided in Chapter II, future studies could contribute a more in-depth policy 
suggestions focusing specifically on one of the following components: legal-
institutional system, administrative system, finance and budgets systems, public-
private partnerships, or monitoring and evaluation systems. In doing so, future studies 
could indicate the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed suggestions, for 









Act on Promotion of Information and Communication Networks Utilization and 
Information Protection, Etc. available 
https://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_service/lawView.do?hseq=38422&lang=ENG 
 
Ahn, Byung Young, “The Changing Role of the State in the 21st Century and 
Governance,” Idea and Ideology (the Quaterly), journal 44 (2000): 13-15. 
 
Bae, Young Ja, National Cybersecurity, (2016): 97-129. 
 
Boys, James. “The Clinton administration’s development and implementation of 
cybersecurity strategy (1993–2001),” Intelligence and National Security 
33, no.5 (2013): 755-770, DOI: 10.1080/02684527.2018.1449369 
 
Cho, Hwha Soon and Kwon Oung, “Comparing Korea and U.S. Cybersecurity 
Governance: from the Perspective of Cyber Threat Securitization Theory,” 
Information Society & Media Vol.18, No. 2 (2017): 97-120. 
 
Christou, George. Cybersecurity in the European Union: Resilience and 
Adaptability in Governance Policy, (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 
(2017): 53-83. 
 









Department of Homeland Security, National Infrastructure Protection Plan 2013: 
Partnering for Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience, 
(Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2013).  
 
EFTA, Electronic Financial Transactions Act, available, 
www.moleg.go.kr/english/korLawEng?pstSeq=47594 
 
Executive Order-13636 (2013): Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity 
 
Flick, et, al. "What is qualitative research? An introduction to the field." A 
companion to qualitative research (2004): 3-11. 
 
 111 
Gary, Thomas. How to do your case study, (London: Sage Pulications, 2015) 
 
Gilbert and Terrell. Dimensions of Social Welfare Policy, (New York: Pearson, 
2013).  
 
Government, National Cybersecurity Masterplan Establishment (Korea 
Communications Commission report, 2011)  
 
Jessop.“Liberalism, Neo-Liberalism and Urban Governance: A State Theoretical 
Perspective,” Antipode 34, no.3 (2002): 452-472. 
https://doi.org/10.1111.1467-8330.00250. 
 
Kidera, Momoko and Sato Ryotaro. “North Korean hackers' evolution on display in 




Kim, Sang Bae (2017), “National Strategy of Cyber Security” 
 
Kim, Do Seung (2017), “A Study on Law and Organization for Strengthening 
Cybersecurity,” Study on the American Constitution 28, no.2 (2017): 99-
130. 
 
Kim, Sangbae. National Cybersecurity Strategy, (Seoul: Critical Perspectives on 
Society Academy, 2017) 
 
Kim, Sangbae. "Cyber Security and Middle Power Diplomacy: A Network 
Perspective." The Korean Journal of International Studies 12, no. 2 
(2014): 323-352. 
 
KISA, Korea Internet and Security Agency, https://www.kisa.or.kr/eng/main.jsp 
 
Kissel, Richard. “Glossary of Key Information Security Terms,” National Institute 
of Standard and Technology, 2013 DoC. USA. 
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir2013/NIST.IR.7298R2.pdf 
 
Klijn, Erik-Hans. "New public management and governance: a comparison." Oxford 
handbook of governance (2012): 201-214. 
 
Kooiman. Governing as Governance, (Sage Publications, 2003):114. 
 
Krippendorff, Klaus. Content analysis: An introduction to its methodology, (Sage 
publications, 2018). 
 
Kuehn A. Extending Cybersecurity, Securing Private Internet Infrastructure: the 
US Einstein Program and its Implications for Internet Governance, In: 
 112 
Radu R., Chenou JM., Weber R. (eds) The Evolution of Global Internet 
Governance. (Springer Publications, 2018). 
 
Kwangho Kim, Sangdon Park, and Jongin Lim. "Changes of cybersecurity legal 
system in East Asia: focusing on comparison between Korea and Japan." 
In International Workshop on Information Security Applications (Springer, 
2015): 348-356. 
 
Lee Myung-seok, “Conceptualizing Governance: Governance as a Social 
Coordination.” Korean Public Administration Review, journal 36, no.4 
(2002): 331-333. 
 
Martin, Timothy.“North Korea While Professing Peace Escalated Cyber attacks on 




Min Sik Kim et. al, “Research on the Need for an Integrative Cyber Crisis 
Management System: Comparing U.S. and Korea’s Institution and 
Policies,” Journal of Information Security 9, no.1 (2009). 
 
Morgan, Steve. "Worldwide cybersecurity spending increasing to $170 billion by 
2020," Forbes March 3 2016, accessed February 12, 2019,   




Nanda, Ved P. "The “good governance” concept revisited." The ANNALS of the 
American academy of political and social science 603, no. 1 (2006): 269-
283. 
 




National Cybersecurity Protection Advancement Act of 2015, available,  
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/1731 
 
National Presidential Security Directive 54: January 2008 Comprehensive National 
Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI) 
 
NIST, https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework 
Nix, et al. "The law of cyber-attack," California Law Review 100, (2012): 817. 
 




Office of Management and Budget Federal Information Security Modernization Act 






Office of Management and Budget, IT Dashboard https://itdashboard.gov/ accessed 
2019.  
 
Overview of cybersecurity, ITU-T X.120, available,  
https://www.itu.int/rec/dologin_pub.asp?lang=s&id=T-REC-X.1205-200804 
 
Park, Sang Don and Kim, Injung. “A Study on Tasks for the Legal Improvement for 
the Governance System in Cybersecurity,” (2013) 
 
Pena, Jorge, J. Luis Guasch, and Alvaro Escribano. “Reforming public institutions 
and strengthening governance: a World Bank strategy,” (The World Bank, 
2000): 78. 
 





Qudrat-I Elahi, Khandakar. "UNDP on good governance," International Journal of 
Social Economics 36, no. 12 (2009): 1167-1180. 
 
Randvanosky and McDougall. Critical infrastructure: Homeland security and 
emergency  preparedness, 4th ed, (Florida: CRC Press, 2016).  
 
Rhodes. “Understanding governance: policy networks, governance, reflexivity and 
accountability,” Public Policy and Management, Philadelphia, US. Open 
University, (1996): 252-254. 
Rohozinski, Farwell, James, and Rafal. "Stuxnet and the Future of Cyber 
War." Survival 53, no. 1 (2011): 23-40. 
 
Rosenzweig, Paul. “The Cybersecurity Act of 2015.” Lawfare, (2015). https://www. 
Lawfareblog.com/cybersecurity-act-2015. 
 
Schatz, et, al. "Towards a More Representative Definition of Cyber Security," 
Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law 12, No. 2, Article 8 (2017). 
 
Schmitt, Michael. Tallinn manual on the international law applicable to cyber 
warfare. (Cambridge University Press, 2013), 45. 
 114 
 
Steve, Morgan. "Worldwide cybersecurity spending increasing to $170 billion by 
2020," Forbes March 3 2016, accessed February 12, 2019,   
 
Stevenson, Angus, and Maurice Waite, eds. Concise Oxford English Dictionary: 
Book & CD-ROM Set (Oxford University Press, 2011). 
 
Stoker, Gerry."Governance as theory: five propositions." International social 
science journal 50, no. 155 (1998): 17-28. 
USA Patriot Act of 2001, 1016(e) (42 U.S.C. 5195c(e)). 
 
Valeriano, Brandon, and Ryan Maness. Cyber war versus cyber realities: Cyber 
conflict in the international system (Oxford University Press, 2015). 
 
Valeriano, Craig, Anthony, and Brandon. "Conceptualising Cyber Arms 
Races,"International Conference on Cyber Conflict 8, (2016):141-158. 
 
Volz, Dustin. “Trump, Seeking to Relax Rules on U.S. Cyber attacks, Reverses 
Obama Directive,” Wall Street Journal, August 15 2018, accessed April 
12, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-seeking-to-relax-rules-on-u-
s-cyberattacks-reverses-obama-directive-1534378721 
Weiss, Thomas. "Governance, good governance and global governance: conceptual 
and actual challenges." Third world quarterly 21, no. 5 (2000): 795-814. 
 
William J. Clinton, National Plan for Information Systems Protection Version 1.0: 
an invitation to a dialogue (Washington DC: The White House, 2000); 
George W. Bush, The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace 
(Washington DC: The White House, 2003). 
 
Won, Byung Chul. “The Reality of Cybersecurity in Korea by Four Cybersecurity 
Experts,” Boan News, November 12 2018, accessed February 10, 2019, 
https://www.boannews.com/media/view.asp?idx=74530. 
 
Yin and Robert K. Case study research and applications: Design and methods, 








우리나라의 국가 사이버안보는 관리체계가 다양한 정부부처들 간에 
분산되어 있음은 물론, 공공, 민간, 군사 부문들 간에도 조정과 연계체계 
매우 부실하다. 따라서 고도로 지능화되고 복잡해 지고 있는 각종 사이버 
공격에 제대로 대처하는 데 한계를 노출하고 있다. 그리고 
사이버안보체계의 안정성 면에서도 문제가 적지 않다. 따라서 국가 
사이버안보체계 전반에 대한 점검과 재구조화가 필요한 시점이다.  
이러한 배경 하에서, 본 논문의 목적은 거버넌스(governance) 관점에 
입각하여 핵심정보인프라 분야에서의 국가 사이버안보체계의 실태와 
문제점을 분석하고 또한 미국의 사이버안보체계에 대한 사례분석을 
행하며, 이를 토대로 핵심정보인프라 분야에서의 사이버안보체계 
강화방안을 제언하고자 하는 것이다.  
이러한 연구목적을 달성하기 위하여 본 논문은 우선 사회과학 분야에서 
널리 사용되고 있는 거버넌스 관점의 등장배경, 의의, 거버넌스 능력 등에 
관한 이론적 논의를 행하였다. 다음에는 이러한 이론적 논의를 참조하여 
거버넌스의 구성요소, 거버넌스의 성공 요건 등을 중심으로 분석틀을 
설정하였다. 이어서 일종의 벤치마킹을 위한 시도로 미국의 
사이버안보체계의 실태를 거버넌스 관점에 입각하여 사례분석을 
행하였다. 다음 장에서는 앞에서 설정된 분석틀에 입각하여 우리나라 
사이버안보 거버넌스 체계의 실태와 문제점을 실증적으로 분석하였다. 
마지막으로는 미국의 사이버안보 거버넌스 체계에 대한 사례 분석과 
우리나라의 사이버안보체계의 실태 및 문제점에 대한 분석을 토대로, 
보다 안정적이고 지속가능한 사이버안보 거버넌스 체계를 구축하기 위한 
구체적인 정책방안들을 제시하였다.  
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